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ABSTRACT 
 
ESSAYS ON CORPORATE FINANCE ISSUES  
 
by 
 
Chanho Cho 
 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2015 
 
Under the Supervision of Professor Lilian K. Ng 
 
This dissertation consists of two essays on corporate finance issues. In the first 
essay (Chapter 1), I explore whether business group affiliations affect the covariance 
structure of stock returns in Korea.  I find that the stock returns of firms belonging to the 
same business group show positive and significant comovement.  The strong 
comovement between group returns and firm returns is explained by correlated 
fundamentals.  I find strong comovement among business group affiliate earnings. 
Moreover, variance decomposition of returns shows that cash flow news plays a 
relatively more important role in explaining group comovement than discount rate news, 
suggesting a link between stock return comovement and the “tunneling” and “propping” 
behaviors of business groups.  Finally, return comovement increases when a firm joins a 
business group. 
 In the second essay I show that, based on the decomposition of a model's R2, latent 
manager qualities play a less important role than firm qualities in explaining the variation 
in innovation productivity. Labor economists argue that the average ability of managers 
who are raided should be higher than the average ability of managers who die suddenly. 
Our results show that the average change in innovation productivity following manager 
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raids is not significantly different from that following manager deaths. The difference in 
abnormal returns surrounding manager raids between high and low innovation firms is 
similar to that surrounding manager sudden deaths. Assuming that exceptionally 
innovative managers are scarce, our results imply that managerial ability to promote 
innovation is not a sufficient determinant of manager quality. Overall, our evidence 
suggests that firm attributes matter more for stimulating corporate innovation than 
managerial attributes. 
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Chapter 1  
 
Stock Return Comovement and Korean Business Groups 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Large, diversified business groups are a prominent feature of the economic 
landscape in many countries, particularly in Asia. A business group is a consortium of firms 
that are connected, often through common share ownership of member firms. It is common 
for a single individual or family to control all member firms, and cross holdings among 
member firms are also typical. The role of business groups has attracted considerable 
academic attention, with researchers presenting evidence in favor of both value-creating 
and value-destructive functions of business groups. However, relatively little attention has 
been paid to correlations among member firm stock returns. 
In this study, we explore whether business group affiliations impact the covariance 
structure of stock returns for business groups in South Korea. Focusing only on Korean 
business groups (known as chaebol) provides two advantages. First, chaebol firms are 
clearly defined. The Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) publishes business group 
membership each year, identifying member firms and ranking groups by total assets. 
Second, focusing on Korean markets helps to control for differences in country-level 
institutional environments that may introduce endogeneity issues and confound results (Joh 
2003).  
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Using stock returns and business group composition data for Korean firms during 
the period 2002-2011, we find that stock returns for firms within the same business group 
exhibit significant comovement, beyond market-wide movements. Furthermore, when we 
control for industry-wide movement the effect of group affiliation on chaebol firm 
comovement remains positive and significant. Our findings are consistent with related 
studies which suggest that corporate governance mechanisms permitting concentrated 
ownership over member firms is associated with increased stock return comovement 
(Morck et al. 2000, Jin and Myers 2006, Fernandes and Ferreira 2008, 2009). 
We next examine the sources of the business group return comovement. Vijh (1994) 
shows evidence that return comovement could arise from fundamental (economic) or 
sentimental (noneconomic) factors.  It is likely that stock return comovement within 
Korean business groups stems from the correlation of the affiliates’ fundamentals. Firms 
within Korean business groups are connected by mutual cross holding agreements. These 
crossholding arrangements might be an underlying factor affecting return comovement, 
because even though a controlling shareholder does not have an incentive to manipulate 
the performance of affiliates, the fundamentals of affiliates maybe affected through equity 
cross holdings (Bae et al. 2008).  Thus, if strong return comovement of business group 
affiliates is significantly influenced by these activities, then the fundamentals of affiliates 
would also exhibit strong comovement.  To test the link between return comovement and 
fundamentals, we measure comovement in group members’ earnings. We find strong 
positive comovement in business group firm earnings, consistent with the fundamental 
explanation of business group return comovement. 
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We further explore the sources of chaebol stock return comovement by evaluating 
the relative importance of two fundamental components of stock returns, cash flow news 
and discount rate news (Campbell 1991). Stock returns change due to innovations in 
expected future cash flows which measures real activity and innovations in the discount 
rate applied to those cash flows, which measures financial activity. Therefore, we 
decompose unexpected stock returns into expected cash flow and discount rate news by 
utilizing the return decomposition framework in Vuolteenaho (2002). We find that stock 
return comovement is, on average, more strongly related to cash flow news comovement 
than discount rate news comovement, suggesting that real activity is more important than 
financial activity in explaining chaebol stock return comovement. 
To validate our evidence that the comovement of stock returns of affiliates is 
attributable to the chaebol group affiliation effect, we examine a subsample of affiliates 
that changed their group affiliation during the sample period. Our investigation is 
motivated by recent studies that have explored the “index inclusion effect” on the 
comovement of stock returns. For example, Barberis et al. (2005) find that corporations 
newly added to the S&P 500 index experience a significant increase in stock return 
comovement with the rest of the index. Empirical analysis of firms that are newly added to 
(or removed from) a Korean business group would provide a more rigorous setting for 
verifying robustness of the group affiliation effect on the comovement of stock returns. We 
find that stock returns of firms that newly join a Korean business group comove positively 
with the returns of the group they join. Prior to joining the chaebol, these firms exhibit an 
insignificant degree of comovement with returns of that group. 
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Our study is related to a working paper by Kim et al. (2014), who focus on 
comovement before and after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The authors find that business 
group comovement increased following the crisis, which they attribute to being in investors’ 
preferred “habitat” along the lines of Barberis et al. 2005. In addition, Kim et al. find that 
comovement is not related to simple fundamental measures such as ROA, cash flow, and 
related party transactions. We extend Kim et al.’s results by decomposing business group 
comovement into cash flow news and discount rate news. Our results contrast with those 
of Kim et al. in that we find substantial evidence that business group comovement is related 
to fundamental factors, as evidenced by group earnings comovement as well as our 
evidence from the decomposition of group returns.  
Our results contribute to the literature on return comovement in three areas. First, 
our results provide new insight into the relationship between business group affiliations 
and the covariance structure of stock returns. Second, we show evidence that stock return 
comovement among chaebol firms is driven by comovement in fundamental factors of 
member firms. Finally, our study makes an important distinction between cash flow news 
and discount rate news, and provides compelling evidence that cash flow news is more 
relevant than discount rate news in the comovement of stock returns among chaebol 
members. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews relevant 
literature. Section 3 describes the data employed in our study. Section 4 documents the 
group comovement of stock returns for firms that are affiliated with Korean business 
groups. In section 5 we explain the decomposition framework of stock returns, and we test 
whether group returns comovement is more strongly associated with cash flow or discount 
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rate news comovement. Section 6 examines changes in business group affiliation, and 
section 7 concludes. 
 
1.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Existing literature has examined the value implications of business groups. One 
collection of studies suggests that business groups have the potential to perform a value 
creating function among member firms. For example, in countries where external capital 
markets are not well developed and have severe information asymmetry, business groups 
can facilitate more efficient allocation of internal capital or sharing of resources and risks. 
Khanna (2000) reviews the literature on business groups in emerging markets and reports 
that they can enhance social welfare in countries that lack certain institutions. Khanna 
argues that business groups may partially replace contract and property rights enforcement 
mechanisms that are more established in developed countries. Khanna and Palepu (2000) 
study business groups in India and find similar results, that business groups can help 
overcome imperfect markets. 
Other studies find evidence that business groups may exploit the weaker institutions 
of the countries in which they operate, taking advantage of minority shareholders. This 
stream focuses on the agency problems that arise from the separation of cash flow and 
control rights, a defining feature of many business groups. This discrepancy in cash flow 
and control rights can create incentives for the controlling shareholder of the group to 
expropriate wealth from member firms, which researchers have termed “tunneling.” 
Johnson et al. (2000) review the legal treatment of tunneling and find that it is prevalent in 
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both developed and emerging countries. Furthermore, the authors find that it is often 
conducted legally, despite being in conflict with minority shareholder interests. Examples 
of such legal tunneling cited by Johnson et al. include the sale of assets from a firm to its 
controlling owner at below-market prices, loan guarantees collateralized by the firm’s 
assets, and excessive executive compensation. Bertrand et al. (2002) find evidence of 
tunneling in Indian business groups. Their methodology is based on how firms respond to 
performance shocks. In contrast, Siegel and Choudhury (2012) question several aspects of 
Bertrand et al.’s methodology.  Most notably, they argue that differences in firm business 
strategy must be considered, or else firm responses to industry shocks may be 
misinterpreted as tunneling. The disparity in the conclusions of these two studies suggests 
that the role of business groups as vehicles for tunneling has not yet been resolved. 
A few studies have looked specifically at chaebol firms in Korea for evidence of 
tunneling. Bae et al. (2002) study chaebol firms and find that when a chaebol firm acquires 
another firm, the chaebol firm’s stock price tends to fall. However, other firms that belong 
to the chaebol tend to have positive abnormal returns around the acquisition. Given that 
the controlling owner of the chaebol has an ownership interest in all member firms, the 
owner benefits overall from the acquisition, consistent with the tunneling hypothesis. 
Almeida et al. (2011) find similar results for chaebol firms, and posit that the shares of such 
firms trade at a discount because they are sometimes used as a vehicle for value-destroying 
acquisitions.  Tunneling is not the only negative side effect of business group affiliation. 
Kim and Yi (2006) find that greater separation of ownership and control at chaebol firms 
is associated with more severe earnings management. 
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Firms that belong to business groups may also benefit from the financial resources 
of other member firms.  It is conceivable that firms facing potential financial distress may 
receive financial backing from other member firms; this “reverse tunneling” is referred to 
as propping by existing literature.  Studies in this segment contend that a controlling 
shareholder of a business group may help member firms experiencing financial difficulty 
by providing private funds or internal capital, so as to reduce the default risk of the firm 
and ensure group survival.  Bae et al. (2008) examine earnings announcements of chaebol 
firms and find that a negative earnings announcement by a firm has a negative effect on 
the market value of all firms that belong to the chaebol, consistent with investor pricing of 
propping within a chaebol.  Friedman et al. (2003) find that controlling shareholders prop 
up member firms as a means to future expropriation of wealth from those firms. 
Researchers have identified comovement among stock returns, citing various 
factors that contribute to return comovement.  Kim et al. (2014) study return comovement 
among Korean business groups.  Their analysis is based on average pairwise correlations 
among member firms vs. industry firms.  The authors find that business group stock returns 
commove more than industry-level stock returns, and that comovement increased after the 
1997 Asian financial crisis.  Kim et al. argue that group comovement cannot be explained 
by fundamental factors, which they measure using firm return on assets (ROA), cash flow, 
and related party transactions.  As described in section 5.2 below, we find that business 
group comovement is significantly related to firm fundamentals. 
Prinsky and Wang (2006) find comovement among firms whose corporate 
headquarters are in the same geographic location.  Interestingly, they find that when a firm 
moves the location of its headquarters, the firm’s returns comove with returns of firms in 
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the new location after the move.  This event study context is an appealing way to 
demonstrate robustness, and we employ it below.  Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) present 
evidence that country level factors explain return comovement much more than industry 
level factors.  Bekaert et al. (2009) use a linear factor model to analyze international stock 
return comovement, and they also find that country of origin explains comovement.  Chan 
et al. (2007) find that firms in the same industry exhibit return comovement, where industry 
is measured according to several popular classification schemes.  Karolyi and Stulz (1996) 
use high frequency intraday trading data to measure comovement between U.S. and 
Japanese stocks. They find that comovement is high during large market movements, and 
they conclude that international diversification does not protect against broad market 
shocks. 
Researchers have also attempted to separate comovement drivers into fundamental 
and sentimental sources.  Barberis and Shleifer (2003) develop a model where firms within 
the same “style” comove, even though their cash flows may be uncorrelated.  They find 
that firms added to the S&P 500 experience a significant increase in comovement with 
other S&P 500 firms.  This result builds on Vijh’s (1994) results and is consistent with the 
sentiment based view of return comovement.  Similarly, Greenwood (2008) looks at firms 
that are overweighted in the Nikkei 225 index and finds that overweight stocks comove 
significantly with other Nikkei 225 stocks.  In addition, being overweight is negatively 
associated with comovement with stocks outside the index.  Kumar and Lee (2006) also 
find support for the sentiment based comovement view by analyzing retail investor stock 
trades. 
9 
 
 
 
Another approach to explaining comovement is by decomposing stock returns into 
different types of news.  Viewing the intrinsic value of an asset as the present value of a 
stream of future cash flows, that asset’s value may fluctuate due to (i) changes in expected 
future cash flows, and (ii) changes in the discount rate applied to those cash flows.  
Campbell (1991) looks at aggregate New York Stock Exchange returns and develops a 
vector auto regression for decomposing index returns into cash flow news and discount 
rate news.  Voulteenaho (2002) elaborates on Campbell’s work by decomposing individual 
stock returns.  He finds that cash flow news is more important for explaining firm-level 
stock returns than discount rate news.  In addition, discount rate news is driven mainly by 
market wide forces. 
 
1.3. DATA 
 
To investigate the relationship between Korean business group membership and 
stock return comovement, we begin with all publicly traded firms listed on the Korean 
Stock Exchange (KSE), taken from Data Guide Pro.  The sample period is 2002-2011.  
We delete firm observations that are missing stock returns or financial information.  We 
also exclude financial firms because they are subject to heavy government regulation and 
are more likely to have different financial policies such as capital and ownership 
structures than other non-financial firms in Korea.  After these screens, our initial sample 
includes 893 firms listed in the KSE over the sample period. 
From our initial sample, we identify firms belonging to Korean business groups 
using data published by the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC).  To identify business 
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group affiliations, we first obtain the information regarding the ranking of Korean business 
groups and the list of affiliates from the KFTC over the sample period.  The list of group 
affiliates announced by the KFTC includes both listed and unlisted affiliates, but we 
consider only listed affiliates.  We exclude business groups owned by the Korean 
government.  We also require that a business group have at least two affiliates in order to 
be included in our sample. 
KFTC reports group affiliation once a year, usually in April.  However, in practice 
a chaebol may sell an affiliate or add a new member firm during the year.  If there is a large 
discrepancy in the date of group affiliation from KFTC’s announcement, we use reports 
from daily newspapers to verify changes in group affiliation.  We follow the KSE’s 
industry classification standard, which is roughly equivalent to the two digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) scheme.  Results are not materially affected if we use the 
SIC classification standard.  In total, we identify 40 Korean business groups with 209 
affiliates in our sample which meet all of the above criteria. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for Korean business groups and their member 
firms in our sample.  Panel A shows the total number of firms listed in the KSE and the 
distribution of the firms which belong to chaebols in the sample, as well as the total number 
of chaebols.  The total number of firms listed in the KSE varies over time.  Starting in 2002 
there were685listedfirms in our sample, and at the end of the sample period in 2011 there 
were 743.  Also, the total number of affiliates listed in the KSE increased from 118 in 
2002to 178 in 2011, and also the number of Korean business groups expanded from 
25groups to 34 groups.  However, not all firms belonging to Korean business groups are 
listed on the KSE.  The average proportion of listed firms in a chaebol is only 20%.  
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Chaebols have a mean group size of 4.5 firms.  Panel B of Table 1shows the characteristics 
of 18industry groups over the sample period.  The mean number of industries per chaebol 
is 3.3, with a maximum of 16 industries, suggesting that business groups in the sample tend 
to be diversified across industries. 
 
1.4. BUSINESS GROUP AND STOCK RETURN COMOVEMENT 
 
1.4.1 Evidence of Stock Return Comovement 
In this section, we examine the impact of Korean business group affiliation on the 
covariance structure of stock returns.  Following existing literature, we employ the capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM) as our baseline model, and begin our analysis by evaluating 
the degree of the return comovement using the slope coefficients from a regression of stock 
returns on the returns of other stocks in the same chaebol.1  We build a set of equally 
weighted portfolio return indices for each chaebol.  We use the returns of all affiliates listed 
in the KSE in the same business group when constructing the return indices.  For each stock 
that belongs to a chaebol, we estimate a stock-level time-series regression at daily, weekly, 
monthly, and quarterly return frequencies: 
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =   𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽
𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑡
𝐺𝑅 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑅𝑡
𝑀𝐾𝑇 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                 (1) 
 
                                                          
1 Kim et al. (2014) calculate pairwise correlations for business groups and average the correlations within 
each business group.  We find it advantageous to use a modified market model that controls for industry and 
market comovement. 
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where, Ri,t denotes the excess return of a particular stock i at time t, and Rt
GR and Rt
MKT 
denote the excess return of the stock’s corresponding business group, and the excess return 
of the market at time t, respectively (Prinsky and Wang 2006).  We exclude the return of 
the firm whose returns are the dependent variable when computing its return relative to the 
rest of the business group (Rt
GR) to avoid introducing spurious correlations. 
As discussed above, existing literature finds that the returns of firms in the same 
industry exhibit comovement (Chan et al. 2007).  Given that chaebols tend to be diversified 
across industries, it is unlikely that our results are driven by such industry effects.  
Nevertheless, we control for possible industry effects by adding a return index for each 
industry by equally weighting the return of the firm’s corresponding industry group in our 
regression model, and we estimate a regression which is an extension of equation (1): 
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =   𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽
𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑡
𝐺𝑅 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑅𝑡
𝑀𝐾𝑇 + 𝛽𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑅𝑡
𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                         (2) 
 
where Rt
IND is the excess return of the firm’s corresponding industry. βGR is our measure of 
comovement, which is the sensitivity of the member firm returns to the return of the rest 
of the chaebol after controlling for other variables in the regression model.  We run the 
above regressions using daily, weekly and monthly return frequencies. 
Table 2 reports the time series regression estimates of equations (1) and (2) and the 
averages of the estimated coefficients, with t-statistics in parentheses.  Results show that 
the stock returns of chaebol firms exhibit robustly positive comovement even after 
controlling for both market and industry effects.  Group betas (βGR) are highly significant 
across both models and all data frequencies. Average group betas vary from 0.309 to 0.515 
13 
 
 
 
over the various specifications. Industry betas (βIND) are between 0.382 and 0.546 across 
specifications.  Group betas remain highly significant after controlling for industry effects, 
suggesting that the strong positive return comovement among firms in the same chaebol is 
not due to industry comovement. 
 
1.5. SOURCES OF GROUP RETURN COMOVEMENT  
 
Having demonstrated evidence of positive stock return comovement among firms 
in the same chaebol, we continue our analysis by looking at comovement from the 
perspective of the intrinsic value of an asset, where innovations in both expected future 
cash flows (fundamentals) and expected discount rates of a firm determine changes in stock 
returns.   
 
1.5.1. Comovement of Earnings  
In this section, we examine the sources of group return comovement by 
investigating the association between firm fundamentals and business group comovement.  
If comovement of chaebol firm stock returns is driven by fundamentals, then the cash flows 
of firms in the same chaebol could also be systematically correlated. Chaebol member 
firms are legally independently firms whose shares are separately traded in the Korean 
stock market.  However, in practice it is believed that member firms serve as subdivisions 
of a controlling shareholder, resulting in close economic relationships among affiliates 
(Chang and Hong 2000).  If strong group comovement of stock returns is driven by group-
wide activities which decrease or increase innovations in the fundamentals of affiliates, 
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then it is possible that firm fundamentals would also exhibit strong comovement within the 
same business group. 
Following Prinsky and Wang (2006), we use quarterly earnings of group members 
as a proxy for firm fundamentals and investigate whether the group effect on return 
comovement of affiliates is driven by the comovement of firms’ fundamental cash flows.  
We construct three earnings measures.  For each firm in our sample, we first calculate the 
change in the level of earnings over the past one, two and four quarters.  We then scale 
each earnings change variable by the firm’s book value of equity, and denote these three 
earnings growth ratesEarning1, Earning2, and Earning4, respectively.  Using these three 
firm-level earnings change variables, we create market, industry, and group earnings 
change indices by equally weighting the earnings changes of all firms within a chaebol, 
industry, and market, denoted as𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑘
𝑀𝐾𝑇, 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑘
𝐼𝑁𝐷, and 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑘
𝐺𝑅, where k = 
(1, 2, 4).  We exclude each firm’s earnings growth ratio from the group and industry index 
to which it belongs.  We also delete all firms with fewer than 16 quarterly earnings during 
the sample period.  We then estimate a time-series regression for each stock: 
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =   𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽
𝐺𝑅𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑘,𝑡
𝐺𝑅 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑘,𝑡
𝑀𝐾𝑇 + βIND𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑘,𝑡
𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡              (3)  
 
Table 3 reports the cross-sectional means of market, industry, and group earnings 
betas.  Results show a significant positive association between a firm’s earnings growth 
rate the earnings growth rates of the business group to which it belongs.  Average group 
betas (βGR) are between 0.2876 and 0.5016across earnings growth rates, with t-statistics all 
greater than 3.  Interestingly, the magnitudes of the market and industry factors are lower, 
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and significance of those betas is not as robust.  Overall, results are consistent with the 
argument that strong comovement of returns is driven by correlation of chaebol firm 
fundamentals.  These results contrast with those of Kim et al. (2014), who do not find 
evidence of a relation between group comovement and firm fundamentals, as measured by 
ROA, cash flow, and related party transactions. 
 
1.5.2. Decomposition of Returns 
We have presented evidence that the stock returns of chaebol firms exhibit positive 
comovement, and that this comovement is consistent with comovement in the 
fundamentals of group members.  We further explore sources of return comovement 
through variance decomposition, separating firm stock returns into cash flow news and 
discount rate news components.  We then evaluate the relative importance of the two return 
components in explaining group comovement.  
 
1.5.2.1 Return Decomposition2 
Based on Campbell's (1991) linear approximation that decomposes firm stock 
returns into cash flow news and discount rate news, Vuolteenhao (2002) implements a log-
linear valuation model based on accounting data by replacing dividends with the clean 
surplus identity (Callen et 2010): 
 
 
                                                          
2See Vuolteenhao (2002) and Callen and Segal (2010) for more details of this method. Callen and Segal 
(2010) provide well documented summary of variance decomposition method. They also support SAS 
programs for estimating variance decompositions from cross sectional time-series data in the appendix. 
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𝑏𝑚𝑡−1 = (𝑟𝑡) −  (𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑡) + 𝑏𝑚𝑡                                                                                                (4)     
𝑏𝑚𝑡−1   = ∑ 𝜌
𝑗
∞
𝑗=0
(𝑟𝑡+𝑗) −  ∑ 𝜌
𝑗
∞
𝑗=0
(𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑡+𝑗)                                                                          (5)     
 
Where bmt, rt, and roet denote the log book to market ratio, log stock returns, and 
log return on equity at time t, and ρj denotes the discount coefficient term.3 Equation (4) 
separates price into expected future cash flow and discount rate news.  In order to analyze 
return, Vuolteenhao further derives the model by taking the change in expectation of 
Equation (4) from t-1 to t and rearranging: 
 
𝑟𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−1(𝑟𝑡) = 𝛥𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝜌
𝑗∞
𝑗=0 (𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑡+𝑗 − 𝑓𝑡+𝑗) −  𝛥𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝜌
𝑗𝑟𝑡+𝑗
∞
𝑗=1                                        (6) 
𝑟𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−1(𝑟𝑡) = 𝑁𝑐𝑓𝑡+1 − 𝑁𝑑𝑟𝑡+1                                                                                              (7) 
 
where ΔEt denotes the change in expectation from period t-1 to t.  
 The return decomposition in equation (7) can be conveniently operationalized via 
vector autoregression. Following Vuolteenaho (2002), we implement the return 
decomposition by employing stock returns, earnings divided by book value of equity, and 
book-to-market ratio as state variables in the VAR model assuming following form: 
 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼1𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝑏𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝜂1𝑡                                                                               (8) 
𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑏𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝜂2𝑡                                                                           (9) 
𝑏𝑚𝑡 = 𝛾1𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛾3𝑏𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝜂3𝑡                                                                         (10) 
                                                          
3Following existing literature, our study assumes that ρ = 1 for simplicity. 
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Notation for the equations above is more convenient in matrix form, and an individual 
firm’s state vector is assumed as follows: 
 
𝑍𝑡 = 𝛤𝑍𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑡                                                                                                                            (11) 
 
where 
𝑍𝑡 = (
𝑟𝑡
𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑡
𝑏𝑚𝑡
),   𝛤 = (
𝛼1 𝛼2 𝛼3
𝛽1 𝛽2 𝛽3
𝛾1 𝛾2 𝛾3
),   𝜂𝑡 = (
𝜂1𝑡
𝜂2𝑡
𝜂3𝑡
) 
 
 Following Vuolteenaho (2002), we compute cash flow news and discount rate news: 
 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 = (𝑒1 + 𝜆1)′𝜂𝑡 
𝑁𝑟𝑡 = 𝜆𝑡′𝜂𝑡 
 
where ek' = (1,0,…,0)is a vector whose first element is one and whose other elements are 
zero, and λk
′ = ek
′ρΓ(I − ρΓ)−1  with (I − ρΓ)−1  being the matrix equivalent of the 
present value of the sum.   
We decompose quarterly stock returns into cash flow and discount rate news by 
estimating the first order VAR model in equation (7).  Following Vuolteenaho (2002), we 
estimate the VAR from panel data using a weighted least squares (WLS) approach and one 
pooled prediction regression per state variable.  We weigh each cross-section equally by 
deflating the data for each firm-quarter by the number of firms in the corresponding cross-
section.  We calculate a set of equally weighted indices for group-, market-, and industry-
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level cash flow and discount rate news comovement for each quarter.  Similar to equation 
(2), we then measure the degree of comovement of cash flow and discount rate news for 
each firm by estimating the following firm level time-series regressions: 
 
𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 =   𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽
𝐺𝑅𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝐺𝑅 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝑀𝐾𝑇 + βIND𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                             (12) 
𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =   𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽
𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑅𝑡
𝐺𝑅 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐷𝑅𝑡
𝑀𝐾𝑇 + βIND𝐷𝑅𝑡
𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                          (13) 
 
1.5.2.2. The Relative Importance of Cash Flow and Discount Rate News  
We evaluate the relative importance of cash flow news and discount rate news on 
group comovement by comparing the magnitude of the coefficients in the cross-sectional 
regression models that include either cash flow news or discount rate news comovement 
variables.  Given that cash flow news is computed by the sum of innovations in current and 
future earnings, we further break down cash flow news into current period and future period 
cash flow news.  We examine the relative contribution of these proxies for real activity and 
financial activity to provide more detailed evidence on the source of cash flow news for 
group comovement (Callen and Segal 2010).  We consider the following cross-sectional 
regression model with various firm and group characteristics as control variables and 
compare the magnitude of the coefficients:  
 
𝐺𝐶𝐼𝑖 =   𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽
𝐷𝑅𝐷𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                         (14) 
 
where GCIi  is the business group stock return comovement beta from equation (2), CFi is 
the is the cash flow news comovement beta from equation (12), DRi is the discount rate 
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news comovement beta from equation (13), Firmi are firm-level control variables, Groupi 
are group-level control variables, and 𝜀𝑖 is an error term.  We consider a set of firm and 
group characteristics that have been documented to be associated with return comovement. 
Earnings correlation is the index of earnings comovement as measured using equation (3).  
Size is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalization measured at the end of the previous 
quarter.  Book-to-market ratio is the ratio of book value of equity over market value of 
equity calculated at the end of the previous quarter.  Leverage is the ratio of total debt to 
total assets.  ROA is return on assets.  Group Assets is the total business group assets 
reported by KFTC.  No. Firms is the natural log of the total number of affiliates in the 
business group.  HHI is the degree of industry diversification of the business group, 
measured by the Herfindahl index.  Institutional Ownership is the equity ownership held 
by mutual fund managers in Korea. 
We average all independent variables over the sample period, then standardize them 
by subtracting the sample mean and dividing by the standard deviation to give the variables 
a zero mean and unit variance (Hirshleifer et al. 2009; Chava and Purnanandam 2010).  
This approach allows direct comparison of the regression coefficients since they represent 
a one standard deviation change in each variable.  We estimate eight different cross-
sectional model specifications to capture the combined explanatory power of these 
fundamentals for group comovement.  This methodology allows us to compare a set of 
factors that best explain variations in group comovement.  
Table 4 presents correlations between the dependent variables (cash flow news, 
current cash flow news, future cash flow news, and discount rate news) and other firm and 
group control variables.  We observe several relations.  First, although group stock return 
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comovement is positively associated with both cash flow and discount rate news 
comovement variables in univariate analysis, cash flow news comovement is more strongly 
associated with group comovement than with discount rate news comovement.  Second, 
future cash flow news comovement is more strongly related to group comovement than 
current cash flow news comovement.  Lastly, the correlation among firm and group specific 
variables is relatively low, with the highest correlation of -0.482 between ROA and 
Leverage, giving us a level of confidence in using independent firm and group variables in 
our models. 
Table 5 reports results of the cross-sectional regressions of business group stock 
return comovement on cash flow news comovement and discount rate news comovement.  
The first two columns estimate the relative contribution of cash flow news and discount 
rate news on group comovement, while the other columns (columns (3)-(8)) further 
decompose cash flow news into current period and future period cash flow news.  We find 
substantial evidence that chaebol stock return comovement is more strongly associated 
with cash flow news than discount rate news, after controlling for both firm and group 
characteristics.  The coefficients on cash flow news in columns (1) and (2) are positive and 
statistically significant, and they are about five times greater in absolute value than the 
coefficient on discount rate news.  Because all independent variables are standardized, the 
coefficients represent the effect of a one standard deviation change, and the difference in 
magnitudes suggests that cash flow news is more important in driving stock return 
comovement than discount rate news.   
We also find that the coefficient of current cash flow news in columns (3) and (4) 
shows little explanatory power for the dependent variable.  Neither of the coefficients on 
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current cash flow news in column (3) and (4) are statistically significant.  Interestingly, 
when future cash flow news is added to the model as shown in column (7) and (8), the 
coefficient of future cash flow news shows considerable explanatory power, suggesting 
that the explanatory power of real activity for group comovement is mainly driven by future 
real activity.  Finally, all models except those in columns (1) and (2) show that the 
coefficient on discount rate news is not significant, further evidence that real activity 
explains stock returns comovement more so than financial activity.  
Overall, VAR analysis suggests that cash flow news comovement plays a more 
important role in explaining Korean business group stock return comovement than discount 
rate news.  In other words, real activity that drives cash flows to equity holders appears 
more strongly associated with return comovement than financial activity, represented by 
the firm’s cost of equity.  Nevertheless, the evidence does not rule out the possibility that 
such a phenomenon can also be jointly driven by both unobserved “tunneling” and 
“propping” behavior of a business group.  Our finding that return comovement is positively 
related to earnings comovement is consistent with the findings of Kim and Yi (2006) that 
earnings management is more prevalent among chaebols.  It is plausible that the 
comovement of affiliated stock returns in Korean business groups could be driven by 
tunneling behavior of the controlling shareholders of chaebols.  Djankov et al. (2008) 
shows that business groups provide direct opportunities to expropriate wealth through 
tunneling using related party transactions.  If such tunneling behavior decreases 
innovations in the cash flows of chaebol members and increases comovement in cash flow 
news, then the observed comovement of chaebol firm stock returns may also reflect 
propping behavior.   
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Byun et al. (2013) demonstrate that chaebol firms have a considerably lower cost 
of debt in the Korean capital market and argue that this is because investors perceive 
enhanced protection from firms belonging chaebols, as membership is a credible signal 
that a troubled firm will receive financial assistance from other member firms.  If this 
group-wide propping activity reduces the default risk of member firms in the business 
group, it is likely that the discount rates of member firms would eventually comove within 
the same business group resulting in the comovement of discount rate news.  However, 
distinguishing these explanations for the group comovement phenomenon is beyond the 
current scope of the study. 
 
1.6. CHANGE IN GROUP MEMBERSHIP 
 
We further examine return comovement using a subset of firms that either joined 
or left a chaebol during the sample period.  If affiliation with a chaebol drives the 
covariance structure of a firm’s stock returns, then analysis of the subsample of firms that 
change group membership could provide a more rigorous setting for testing of the group 
comovement effect. 
We identify firms that join or leave chaebols by comparing the KFTC list of Korean 
business groups in two consecutive years.  We then manually verify the date the firm joins 
or leaves the group using major newspapers and the database compiled by the Korean 
Listed Companies’ Association (KLCA).  Our final subsample of firms that change group 
membership consists of 40addition and 17 removal events over the sample period.  To 
assess the effect of changes in chaebol membership on return comovement, for each 
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addition and removal we estimate the following regression separately for the 3 years before 
and 3 years after the event: 
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =   𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽
𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑡
𝐺𝑅 + 𝛽𝐷𝑈𝑀𝐷𝐺𝑅 + 𝛽𝐷𝐺𝑅𝐷𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑡
𝐺𝑅 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑅𝑡
𝑀𝐾𝑇 + 𝛽𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑅𝑡
𝐼𝑁𝐷  
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                  (15) 
 
Ri,t is the excess return of a stocki, Rt
GR is the excess return of the stock’s business 
group, Rt
MKT is the return on the market portfolio, and Rt
IND is the equally weighted index 
of the stock’s industry.  DGR is a dummy variable identifying the firm’s addition to or 
removal from the business group.  To clarify the interpretation of the dummy variable, we 
define it in two different ways, according to whether a firm was added to or removed from 
a chaebol.  The dummy variable for addition to a chaebol takes a value of 0 if the firm stays 
out of the business group, and 1 when it is added to the group.  If a firm is removed from 
a chaebol, we assign the value of 0 when the firm stays in the group, and 1 when the firm 
leaves the group.  We are most interested in the interaction between addition/deletion and 
comovement, and the effect of this change in business group affiliation on return 
comovement is measured by βDGR.  We run the above regression for daily, weekly and 
monthly return frequencies.  We exclude the 6 month period ending the month before and 
after the addition or removal announcement to reflect the time for incorporation and 
diffusion of information to investors. 
Table 6 presents the results of regressions with the chaebol addition and removal 
dummy.  Panel A shows the average of the estimated betas with respect to the various 
indices when affiliates are added to a business group, and panel B shows the average of 
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the estimated betas when they are removed from a business group.  Although removal from 
a business group is not significantly associated with changes in comovement, results show 
that firms newly added to a chaebol experience a significant increase in sensitivity to that 
chaebol’s stock returns (βDGR).  This result holds for daily, weekly and monthly return 
frequencies.  The increase in βDGR is between 0.111and 0.181 across return frequencies.  
This result supports the evidence presented earlier using the full sample, implying that a 
firm’s addition to a business group has a significant and positive effect on that firm’s 
comovement with other firms in the same business group, consistent with Kim et al. (2014). 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
 Despite the increased academic interest in the role of business groups in a country’s 
economy, the impact of business group affiliations on the stock prices of member firms is 
relatively unexplored.  This study investigates whether the Korean business group 
affiliations affect the covariance structure of underlying stock returns.  We find positive 
and significant comovement in the stock returns of firms belonging to the same Korean 
business group.  We also demonstrate that our findings are robust to a subsample of affiliate 
firms that changed their group affiliation. 
We also examine the comovement of chaebol member firm fundamentals.  
Consistent with the fundamental-based explanations, our results indicate that the 
comovement of stock returns can be explained by comovement in corporate earnings.  
These findings suggests that investors take into account other consider firms belonging to 
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the same business group as relevant since the unique governance and structural system of 
Korean business groups allows coordination of firm activities within the group. 
Finally, given that strong comovement in the stock returns of group affiliates is 
attributed to correlation of fundamentals, we further explores more detailed sources of the 
group returns comovement by examining the relative importance of cash flow and discount 
rate news.  We find that cash flow news plays a greater role in explaining stock return 
comovement than discount rate news.  Our evidence that Korean business group return 
comovement is driven by the relative importance of two fundamental return factors 
contrasts sharply with the results of Kim et al. (2014) and may have important implications 
about the widely documented tunneling and propping behaviors of business groups.  That 
is, our results might imply that the comovement of cash flow and discount rate news are 
closely related to unobserved tunneling and propping behaviors of business groups, 
respectively.  However, although our study suggests a possible linkage between two return 
decomposing components and tunneling and propping behaviors, whether tunneling or 
propping effects contribute significantly to the phenomenon of group comovement is an 
interesting issue that warrants future research.  
26 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
 
Almeida, H., S. Y. Park, M. G. Subrahmanyam, D Wolfenzon. 2011. The structure and 
formation of business groups: Evidence from Korean chaebols. Journal of Financial 
Economics 99, 447-475. 
 
Bae, G. S., Y. S. Cheon, and J.-K. Kang. 2008. Intragroup propping: Evidence from the 
stock-price effects of earnings announcements by Korean business groups. Review of 
Financial Studies 21 (5), 2015-2060. 
 
Bae, K.-H., J.-K. Kang, and J.-M. Kim. 2002. Tunneling or value added? Evidence from 
mergers by Korean business groups. Journal of Finance 57 (6), 2695-2740. 
 
Barberis, N., A. Shleifer. 2003. Style investing. Journal of Financial Economics 68, 161-
199. 
 
Barberis, N., A. Shleifer, and J. Wurgler. 2005. Comovement. Journal of Financial 
Economics 58, 81-112. 
 
Bekaert, G., R. J. Hodrick, X Zhang. 2009. International stock return comovements. 
Journal of Finance 64, 2591-2626. 
 
Bertrand, M., P Maehta, S. Mullainathan. 2002. Ferreting out tunneling. Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 117, 121-148. 
 
Byun, H.-Y., S. Choi, L.-S. Hwang, R. G. Kim. 2013. Business group affiliation, ownership 
structure, and the cost of debt. Journal of Corporate Finance 23, 311-331. 
 
Callen, J. L., and D. Segal. 2010. A variance decomposition primer for accounting research. 
Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance 25 (1), 121-142. 
 
Campbell, J. Y. 1991. A variance decomposition for stock returns. Economic Journal 101, 
157-179.  
 
Chan, L.K.C., J. Lakonishok, B. Swaminathan. 2007. Industry classification and return 
comovement. Financial Analysts Journal 63, 56-70. 
 
Chang, S. J., J Hong. 2000. Economic performance of group-affiliated companies in Korea: 
Intragroup resource sharing and internal business transactions. Academy of Management 
Journal 43, 429-448. 
 
Chava, S., and A. Purnanandam. 2010. CEOs: Incentives and corporate polices. Journal of 
Financial Economics 97, 263-278. 
 
27 
 
 
 
Djankov, S., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. 2008. The law and 
economics of self-dealing. Journal of Financial Economics 88 (3), 430-465.Fernandes, N., 
Ferreira, M.A., 2008. Does international cross-listing improve the information 
environment? Journal of Financial Economics 88, 216-244. 
 
Fernandes, N., Ferreira, M.A., 2009. Insider trading laws and stock price informativeness. 
Review of Financial Studies 22, 1845-1887. 
 
Friedman, E., S. Johnson, and T. Mitton. 2003. Propping and tunneling. Journal of 
Comparative Economics 31 (4), 732-750. 
 
Greenwood, R 2008. Excess comovement and stock returns: Evidence from cross-sectional 
variation in Nikkei 225 weights. Review of Financial Studies 21, 1153-1186 
 
Heston, S. L., K. G Rouwenhorst. 1994. Doe industrial structure explain the benefits of 
international diversification? Journal of Financial Economics 36, 3-27. 
 
Hirshleifer, D., K. Hou, and S.H. Teoh. 2009. Accruals, cash flows, and aggregate stock 
returns. Journal of Financial Economics 91, 389-406. 
 
Jin, L., Myers, S.C., 2006. R-square around the world: new theory and new tests. Journal 
of Financial Economics 79, 257-292.Joh, S. W. 2003. Corporate governance and firm 
profitability: Evidence from Korea before the economic crisis. Journal of Financial 
Economics 68 (2), 287-322. 
 
Joh, S. W., 2003. Corporate governance and firm profitability: Evidence from Korea before 
the economic crisis. Journal of Financial Economics 68 (2):287-322. 
 
Johnson, S., R. La Porta, and A. Shleifer. 2000. Tunneling. American Economic Review, 
22-27. 
 
Karolyi, G. A., R. M. Stulz. 1996. Why do markets move together? An investigation of 
U.S.-Japan stock return comovements. Journal of Finance 51, 951-986. 
 
Khanna, T. 2000. Business groups and social welfare in emerging markets: Existing 
evidence and unanswered questions. European Economic Review 44, 748-761. 
 
Khanna, T., K. Palepu. 2000. Is group affiliation profitable in emerging markets? An 
analysis of diversified Indian business groups. Journal of Finance 55, 867-891. 
 
Kim, J.B., Yi, C.H., 2006. Ownership structure, business group affiliation, listing status, 
and earnings management: evidence from Korea. Contemporary Accounting Research 23, 
427-464. 
 
Kim, M.S., W. Kim, D.W. Lee, 2014. Stock return commonality within business groups: 
fundamentals or sentiment? Unpublished working paper. 
28 
 
 
 
Kumar, A., C. M. C. Lee. 2006. Retail investor sentiment and return comovements. Journal 
of Finance 61, 2451-2486. 
 
Morck, R., Yeung, B., Yu, W., 2000. The information content of stock markets: why do 
emerging markets synchronous stock price movements? Journal of financial Economics 
58, 215-238 
 
Pirinsky, Christo, and Wang, Qinghai, 2006, Does Corporate Headquarters Location matter 
for Stock Returns? Journal of Finance, 1991-2015. 
 
Siegal, J., P. Choudhury. 2012. A reexamination of tunneling and business groups: New 
data and new methods. Review of Financial Studies 25, 1763-1798. 
 
Vijh, A. M. 1994. S&P 500 trading strategies and stock betas. Review of Financial Studies 
7, 215-251. 
 
Vuolteenaho, T. 2002. What drives firm-level stock returns? Journal of Finance 57 
(1):233-264. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A provides the total number of firms in a Korean business group in the sample as well as the 
distribution of the number of firms per business group over the sample period. Panel B reports the 
distribution of the total number of industries in each business group. The sample includes domestic 
common stocks listed on the KSE from 2002 to 2011 with coverage in DataGuide. 
 
 
Panel A: Number of firms in a Korean business group 
Year 
No. 
KSE-
listed 
firms 
No. KSE-listed 
firms belonging 
to a business 
group 
No. business 
groups 
Number of firms per business group 
Mean Max Min 
2002 685 118 25 4.7 17 2 
2003 694 124 26 4.8 17 2 
2004 693 140 30 4.7 16 2 
2005 684 141 31 4.5 14 2 
2006 684 144 32 4.5 14 2 
2007 696 152 34 4.5 15 2 
2008 710 160 34 4.7 15 2 
2009 729 168 34 4.9 16 2 
2010 742 184 34 5.4 18 2 
2011 743 178 34 5.2 17 2 
Panel B: Distribution of the total number of industries 
Year     
Number of 
Industries 
Number of Industries per business group 
Mean Max Min 
2002   18 3.2 15 1 
2003   18 3.3 16 1 
2004   18 3.2 15 1 
2005   18 3.1 11 1 
2006   18 3.2 13 1 
2007   18 3.0 13 1 
2008   18 3.1 11 1 
2009   18 3.2 12 1 
2010   18 3.5 12 1 
2011     17 3.3 9 1 
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Table 2 
Business Group Comovement 
 
For each stock in the sample, we estimate a time-series regression of stock returns on the returns 
of a business group index, the market portfolio, and industry indices. Cross-sectional averages of 
the estimated coefficients are reported, with t-statistics in parentheses. The group index (GR) is the 
equally weighted return of all stocks from the firm’s corresponding business group, excluding the 
firm itself. The market index (MKT) is the return index of all stocks listed in the Korean stock 
market. The industry index (IND) is the equally weighted return of the stock’s corresponding 
industry, according to the KSE 18-industry classification. The sample period is 2002 to 2011. 
 
 
Frequency   βGROUP   βMKT   βIND   
Daily 
              
 0.344  0.7056    
 (18.27)  (29.40)    
       
 0.309  0.3579  0.382  
  (17.22)   (11.13)   (13.31)   
Weekly 
              
 0.370  0.6937    
 (15.11)  (21.42)    
       
 0.335  0.2931  0.433  
  (14.30)   (6.91)   (12.24)   
Monthly 
              
 0.486  0.5795    
 (11.78)  (10.44)    
       
 0.432  0.1030  0.546  
  (10.49)   (1.58)   (7.26)   
Quarterly 
       
 0.515  0.4838    
 (9.58)  (7.72)    
       
 0.473  0.0863  0.456  
 (7.30)  (0.82)  (4.34)  
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Table 3 
Business Group Earnings Comovement 
 
For each stock in the sample, we estimate time-series regressions of its earnings growth rate on 
group, industry and market earnings growth indices. Earning1, Earning2, and Earning4 are the 
earnings change from the previous 1, 2, and 4 quarters, respectively, scaled by the lagged book 
value of equity. The group and industry earnings-growth indices include all stocks from the firm’s 
corresponding business group and industry, excluding the firm itself, and the market earnings 
growth index includes all stocks in the Korean stock market. Average values of the estimated 
coefficients are reported with t-statistics in parentheses. The sample includes domestic common 
stocks traded on KSE from 2002 to 2011 with coverage in Data Guide. 
 
 
  
Group 
Earnings 
Growth   
Market 
Earnings 
Growth   
Industry 
Earnings 
Growth 
      
Earning1 0.2876  0.0989  0.1668 
 (3.56)  (1.65)  (2.10) 
      
Earning2 0.4852  0.0182  0.0658 
 (5.77)  (0.80)  (1.00) 
      
Earning4 0.5016  0.072  0.0747 
 (3.10)  (1.31)  (0.81) 
            
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
3
2 
Table 4 
Correlation Matrix 
This table presents correlations. Group comovement is the sensitivity of a firm's stock returns to the stock returns of the other firms belonging to the 
same business group.  Cash flow news and discount rate news are based on Vuolteenaho's (2002) stock return decomposition.  Size is the log of firm 
market capitalization.  Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets.  Book to market is the ratio of book to market equity.  ROA is return on 
assets.  Earning comovement is the sensitivity of a firm's earnigns to the earnings of the other firms belonging to the same business group.  Group 
assets is the total assets of the firm's business group.  No. Firms is the log of the number of firms in the business group.  Institutional ownership is 
the equity ownership held by mutual fund managers in Korea.   
 
  
Group 
Comovement 
Cash 
Flow 
News 
Current 
Cash 
Flow 
News 
Future 
Cash 
Flow 
News 
Discount 
Rate 
News 
Size Leverage 
Book to 
Market 
ROA 
Earnings 
Comovement 
Group 
Assets 
No. 
Firms 
Herfindahl 
Index 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Group 
Comovement 
1.000              
Cash Flow News 0.533 1.000             
Current Cash Flow 
News 
0.061 -0.177 1.000            
Future Cash Flow 
News 
0.513 0.836 -0.128 1.000           
Discount Rate 
News 
0.268 -0.106 0.178 -0.009 1.000          
Size -0.027 0.105 0.014 0.104 0.102 1.000         
Leverage -0.008 -0.042 0.145 -0.148 -0.254 -0.023 1.000        
Book to Market 0.016 0.098 -0.144 0.072 -0.034 -0.454 -0.190 1.000       
ROA -0.051 -0.066 -0.077 0.007 0.232 0.367 -0.482 -0.254 1.000      
Earning 
Comovement 
0.040 -0.055 0.379 0.151 0.044 -0.112 0.110 0.012 -0.097 1.000     
Group Assets 0.011 -0.037 0.088 -0.011 0.143 0.471 -0.011 -0.401 0.176 0.050 1.000    
No. Firms -0.031 -0.029 0.100 -0.044 0.086 0.245 -0.088 -0.231 0.106 0.032 0.688 1.000   
Herfindahl Index -0.136 -0.026 0.023 -0.036 0.023 0.088 -0.195 -0.180 0.133 0.010 0.208 0.525 1.000  
Institutional 
Ownership 
0.103 0.052 0.022 0.082 0.074 0.043 -0.040 -0.085 0.038 0.020 0.204 0.121 0.047 1.000 
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Table 5 
Business Group Comovement and Stock Return Decomposition 
 
The dependent variable is the degree of stock return comovement with a firm's business group. 
Cash Flow News and Discount Rate News are based on the return decomposition of Vuolteenaho 
(2002). We standardize all independent variables over the sample period. Coefficient estimates are 
reported with t-statistics in parentheses. The sample includes domestic common stocks traded on 
KSE from 2002 to 2011 with coverage in Data Guide. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Cash Flow News 0.7368 0.6978       
 (9.39) (9.06)       
Current  Cash Flow 
News 
  0.0614 0.0739   0.0554 0.067 
   (0.78) (0.98)   (0.82) (1.02) 
Future  Cash Flow 
News 
    0.647 0.5955 0.6461 0.594 
     (6.98) (6.42) (6.96) (6.41) 
Discount Rate News 0.1443 0.121 0.2124 0.1798 0.1038 0.0882 0.0972 0.0799 
 (2.91) (2.55) (3.40) (2.97) (1.87) (1.62) (1.73) (1.45) 
Size 0.0241 0.0098 0.0971 0.0783 0.0481 0.0309 0.0479 0.0299 
 (0.87) (0.34) (2.85) (2.17) (1.60) (0.95) (1.59) (0.92) 
Leverage 0.1263 0.09 
-
0.0168 
-
0.1204 
0.1056 0.0359 0.0862 0.0071 
 (0.54) (0.38) (-0.06) (-0.40) (0.41) (0.14) (0.33) (0.03) 
Book to Market  0.0678 0.0957 0.1105 0.1315 0.0646 0.0903 0.0692 0.0956 
 (1.47) (1.99) (1.85) (2.14) (1.26) (1.68) (1.34) (1.77) 
ROA 5.8642 5.6724 0.4559 
-
0.1881 
1.6919 1.6023 1.987 1.9285 
 (1.50) (1.46) (0.09) (-0.04) (0.40) (0.38) (0.46) (0.45) 
Earning Comovement 0.0794 0.0712 0.0556 0.0453 0.0189 0.0158 0.0068 0.0012 
 (2.29) (2.11) (1.16) (0.98) (0.49) (0.41) (0.16) (0.03) 
Group Asset  0.099  0.1297  0.1192  0.1247 
  (1.88)  (1.93)  (2.03)  (2.12) 
No. Firms  
-
0.0028 
 
-
0.0062 
 
-
0.0045 
 
-
0.0049 
  (-0.80)  (-1.39)  (-1.16)  (-1.27) 
Herfindahl Index  
-
0.0852 
 
-
0.1057 
 
-
0.0842 
 
-
0.0811 
  (-1.10)  (-1.07)  (-0.97)  (-0.94) 
Institutional Ownership  3.7059  5.2461  2.972  2.904 
  (2.16)  (2.41)  (1.53)  (1.50) 
Intercept 0.7565 1.2485 2.4402 2.9837 1.2623 1.7673 1.2692 1.7923 
 (-0.96) (-1.56) (-2.48) (-3.00) (-1.47) (-1.99) (-1.47) (-2.02) 
Adjusted R2 (%) 47.63 51.12 13.28 20.60 36.21 39.39 36.06 39.40 
Number of Obs. 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
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Table 6 
Changes in Stock Return Comovement for Firms that Join or Leave Business Groups 
 
We identify a sample of 57 firms that either join or leave business groups between 2002 and 2011. 
For each stock in the sample we estimate a time-series regression for the 3 years prior to and the 3 
years subsequent to the event (inclusion or deletion from business group). Panel A reports results 
for firms that join a business group; in this panel, DUM takes a value of 1 if a firm joins a business 
group. Panel B reports results for firms that leave a business group; in this panel, DUM takes a 
value of 1 if a firm leaves a group. DGR is the interaction between group comovement and the 
indicator for joining/leaving a group. The group index (GR) is constructed as the equally weighted 
return of all stocks from the firm’s corresponding business group, excluding the firm itself. The 
market index (MKT) is the return index of all stocks listed on the KSE. The industry index (IND) 
is the equally weighted return of the stock’s corresponding industry, according to the KSE 18-
industry classification. Cross-sectional averages of coefficient estimates are presented, with t-
statistics in parentheses. 
 
 
Sample   βGROUP βDUM βDGR βMKT βIND 
Panel A: Additions       
 Daily   0.036 0.400 0.111 0.359 0.618 
 t-stat  (1.43) (3.04) (4.19) (4.14) (8.19) 
 Weekly   0.037 0.091 0.132 0.726 0.298 
 t-stat  (0.70) (0.30) (2.34) (6.66) (3.47) 
 Monthly  0.078 -1.638 0.181 0.186 0.749 
  t-stat   (0.78) (2.11) (2.01) (4.92) (1.32) 
Panel B: Deletions       
 Daily   0.177 -0.110 -0.051 0.267 0.588 
 t-stat  (3.50) (0.37) (0.82) (2.97) (6.20) 
 Weekly   0.126  0.467  0.017  0.899  0.017  
 t-stat  (1.60) (1.46) (0.20) (0.16) (7.20) 
 Monthly  0.214 3.792 0.084 0.018 0.770 
   t-stat   (1.06) (2.52) (0.43) (0.06) (3.08) 
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Chapter 2 
 
Do Managers Matter for Corporate Innovation? 
 
“We are asking you to see the success of visionary companies – at least in part 
– as coming from underlying processes and fundamental dynamics … not 
primarily the result of a single great idea or some great, all-knowing, godlike 
visionary who made great decisions, had great charisma, and led with great 
authority.” 
 - Collins and Porras (2002) 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
It is widely recognized that innovation is a significant driver for long-run 
economic growth. In his seminal paper, Solow (1956) shows that technological 
innovation contributed over 80% of the U.S.’s economic growth between 1909 and 
1949 and that technological improvements are necessary for sustained economic 
growth. Recent financial research finds that innovation is vital to firm survival 
(Eisdorfer and Hsu, 2011), competitive advantage (Porter, 1992), and is positively 
associated with firm value (Hall,  Jaffe,  and  Trajtenberg, 2005)  as  well  as  stock  
returns  (Rossi,  2006). Despite the importance of innovation for firms and to society 
as a whole, we know little about the key factors that drive innovation. Is it latent 
36 
 
 
 
abilities of the CEO and top management or the firm’s culture and environment that 
spur corporate innovation? The goal of our study is to assess the relative importance 
of time invariant firm and manager characteristics in explaining firms’ innovation 
productivity. 
Businesses thrive when firms innovate. Popular media and practitioners 
suggest that top management is important in building a framework for successful 
innovation. For example, recent media sentiment deifies innovative managers and 
speculates about the next great innovator or the next Steve Jobs4. These media stories 
suggest that extraordinary latent qualities in top executives are important for 
innovation. Other practitioners emphasize a firm’s physical environment and/or a 
corporate culture that reinforces thinking and idea generation as important 
determinants of innovation 5 . It is undeniable that all these firm and manager 
qualities, while latent, are necessary to encourage corporate innovation. 
Existing empirical research finds that firm or managerial characteristics, 
including year effects, can explain up to about 54% of the cross-sectional variation 
in innovation productivity, leaving a substantial portion of the variation 
unexplained6. The quote from Collins and Porras (2002), at the start of the paper, 
                                                          
4 See The Book of Jobs, \The Economist, Jan. 28th 2010; \How to hire the Next Steve Jobs," Inc.com, Oct.30, 
2013; \Je_ Bezos isn't the next Steve Jobs," CNNMoney, Dec. 3, 2013; A Google search for \the next Steve 
Jobs" yields about 1.5 million results. 
5  See \Why corporate culture is important for innovation," by Je_rey Phillips, Senior Leader at OVO 
Innovation, December 29, 2012; http://www.innovationexcellence.com/blog/2012/12/29/why-corporate-
culture-is-important-for-innovation/. See, also, \Why environment matters for innovation," by J. Phillips, 
December 30, 2012; http://www.innovationexcellence.com/blog/2012/12/20/why-environment-
matters-to-innovation/. 
6 For example, studies show that firm-level characteristics, such as stock market liquidity (Fang, Tian, and 
Tice, 2013), equity market development (Hsu, Tian, and Xu, 2013), analyst coverage (He and Tian, 2013), 
anti-takeover provisions (Chemmanur and Tian, 2013), local banking competition (Cornaggia et al., 2013), 
firm alliances (Schilling and Phelps, 2007), business groups (Belenzon and Berkovitz, 2010), and 
institutional ownership (Aghion, Reenen, and Zingales, 2009) matter for innovation. Others suggest that 
managerial characteristics, such as CEO overconfidence (Galasso and Simcoe, 2011; Hirshleifer, Low, and 
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implies that firm success is not primarily the result of unobservable managerial fixed 
effects such as managerial skills, charisma, and talents, but is “at least in part” the 
result unobservable firm fixed effects such as firm culture and the underlying 
processes and fundamental dynamics of a firm. The evidence presented in this paper 
is largely consistent with this view. Manager fixed effects, while still important, 
explain a smaller portion of the variation in firm level innovation productivity than 
firm fixed effects in the majority of our tests. 
A few empirical studies have looked beyond observable characteristics to 
understand the role of managers in explaining corporate policies. For example, 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) show that the role of CEOs and top executives is more 
important in determining some corporate decisions than others. When adding 
manager fixed effects to models of corporate policies that have already 
incorporated both observable and unobservable time invariant firm characteristics, 
they show that the adjusted R2’s increase by more than four percentage points. 
Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012) provide evidence that firm and, especially, manager 
fixed effects explain a substantial portion of the variation in executive pay. Coles 
and Li (2012) find that manager fixed effects have varying explanatory powers for 
several corporate policies. All these studies mainly show the importance of 
manager fixed rather than firm fixed attributes in corporate policies and decision-
making. In contrast, Kaplan, Sensoy, and Stromberg (2009) show that firm fixed 
effects are more critical than manager fixed effects in startups and early stage 
                                                          
Teoh, 2012), managers' compensation structure (Xue, 2007; Manso, 2011; Lerner and Wulf, 2007), and 
managers' motives (Sauermann and Cohen, 2010), can explain variation in innovation productivity. 
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ventures. However, none of these studies examines the extent to which manager or 
firm fixed effects influence innovation. 
In this study, we conduct a thorough analysis to determine the contributions 
of unobservable manager and firm fixed effects to corporate innovation beyond 
those of their observable characteristics. We gauge the extent of a firm’s 
innovation productivity by the number of patents and patent citations available 
from the NBER Patent Citations Database (Trajtenberg, 1990; Hall and Ziedonis, 
2001; Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005) and use the information on executives 
from ExecuComp. After merging the two databases, our sample contains 75,491 
firm-year observations with complete data for the period of 1992 to 2006. Our 
main tests employ Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis’s (1999, henceforth AKM) 
method to determine the proportion of the model R2 attributable to observable and 
time-invariant unobservable firm and managerial characteristics 7 . The AKM 
approach improves on the mover dummy variable (MDV) method developed by 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003), who study a subset of data that comprises only 
managers who change firms (henceforth the mobility sample), while including 
manager, firm, and year fixed effects in the model specification. Specifically, the 
AKM approach expands and draws inferences from the mobility sample to a 
“connected sample”, which includes both movers and non-movers, thus increasing 
the sample size and reducing the potential selection bias created by examining only 
managers that switch firms. 
                                                          
7 The AKM method is employed by Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012) and Coles and Li (2012). 
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Contrary to popular press and to the existing evidence on corporate policies 
but consistent with Collins and Porras (2002), we find unobservable firm fixed 
effects play a larger role in innovation productivity. However, manager fixed effect 
also appear to be important but perhaps to a lesser degree. Our empirical results 
indicate firm fixed effects, as opposed to manager fixed effects, explain the 
majority of the variation in firm innovation productivity, even after incorporating 
observable firm and manager attributes as well as year effects into the models. 
Depending on the empirical methodology employed (AKM vs MDV), firm fixed 
effects contribute about 50% and 70%, while manager fixed attributes account for 
about 30% and 14%, of the explained variation in firm innovation productivity 
respectively. Our findings are robust to a subsample of firms that were granted at 
least one patent and to another subsample that consists of only CEOs in firms with 
at least one patent.  These robustness tests help eliminate the possibility that 
unobservable differences between firms with and without patents, or managers that 
would not be expected to contribute to innovation, such as CFOs, are not driving 
our main results. 
We also examine the impact of manager/firm separations on corporate 
innovation productivity. Labor economists suggest that raided managers are more 
likely to be of higher quality (Lazear 1986; Hayes and Schaefer 1999). Thus, 
building on Hayes and Schaefer, we compare the change in corporate innovation 
following manager raids (i.e., a manager leaves for a similar position at another 
firm) to the change in corporate innovation following manager sudden deaths. 
Sudden deaths are likely to occur randomly. Hence, a sample of managers that 
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suddenly die is likely to be of average quality. If raided managers, on average, are 
indeed of higher quality and their ability to innovate is an important factor in 
determining quality, we would expect corporate innovation output to fall after 
manager raids relative to the change in innovation output for a sample of firms 
whose managers die suddenly. Our results do not find that innovation productivity 
falls more following manager raids compared to that following manager deaths, 
suggesting that on average managers’ ability to innovate is not a major determinant 
of manager quality or innovation productivity. 
Further, if managers are matched to firms based on their ability to innovate, 
we would expect that raids of managers from firms with high innovation 
productivity, on average, would have a larger impact on firm value than raids of 
managers from firms with low innovation productivity, as exceptionally innovative 
managers are likely to be scarce. We thus compare the difference between 
abnormal stock returns surrounding manager raids and manager deaths in firms 
with high versus low innovation productivity. Our findings indicate no significant 
difference in firm valuation effects between raids of managers from firms with 
high innovation productivity and those from firms with low innovation 
productivity. Overall, the results are consistent with our earlier key finding using 
the AKM and MDV methodologies that firm characteristics matter more for 
innovation than manager characteristics. 
This paper expands the existing literature in several directions. First, our 
study adds to the literature that examines the effects of manager characteristics on 
firm performance. In particular, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) find that manager 
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fixed effects are related to accounting measures of firm performance, whereas 
Coles and Li (2012) show that managerial characteristics explain 30% to 50% of 
the variation in return on assets and Tobin’s Q. Further, managers have previously 
been shown to improve operating performance of small textile firms (Bloom et al., 
2013), and national leaders have been linked to national growth (Jones and Olken, 
2005). In contrast to these studies, we find relatively less contribution from 
manager fixed effects to patented innovation, a performance metric that is less 
likely to be manipulated by managers. 
Second, our paper offers new insights on the literature investigating the 
relative importance of non-human and human assets. Consistent with our evidence, 
Kaplan, Sensoy, and Stromberg (2009) find that, at the margin, firm-level 
characteristics matter more for the success of early- stage companies, compared to 
managerial characteristics. Our work expands the prior literature in that our sample 
is not confined to a single industry (Bloom et al., 2013), or to early-stage 
companies (Kaplan, Sensoy, and Stromberg, 2009), but it covers a broad range of 
publicly-traded U.S. companies, which are more representative of the economy as 
a whole. 
Finally, this paper also contributes to the growing literature on the 
determinants of corporate innovation. A large body of recent research finds that 
firm-level characteristics, such as stock market liquidity (Fang, Tian, and Tice, 
2013), equity market development (Hsu, Tian, and Xu, 2013), analyst coverage 
(He and Tian, 2013), anti-takeover provisions (Chemmanur and Tian, 2013), local 
banking competition (Cornaggia et al., 2013), firm alliances (Schilling and Phelps, 
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2007), business groups (Belenzon and Berkovitz, 2010), and institutional 
ownership (Aghion, Reenen, and Zingales, 2009), explain variation in innovation 
productivity. Other research suggests that managerial characteristics, such as CEO 
overconfidence (Galasso and Simcoe, 2011; Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh, 2012), 
managers’ compensation structure (Xue, 2007; Manso, 2011; Lerner and Wulf, 
2007), and managers’ motives (Sauermann and Cohen, 2010), explain variation in 
innovation productivity. However, our study provides evidence as to which type 
of characteristics identified by prior studies (firm or manager) is more important 
in explaining the variation in innovation productivity of large U.S. corporations.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the 
data and methodology. Section 3 discusses the empirical results, and Section 4 
concludes the paper. 
 
2.2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
2.2.1. Sample Construction 
Our main sample starts with the intersection of the following three databases: The 
NBER Patent Citations Database, ExecuComp, and Compustat. We first collect firms’ 
patents and citations – the main variables of interest in this study – from the NBER Patent 
Citations Database. This database provides information of all utility patents and citations 
granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) from 1976 to 2006. 
From this database, we obtain the following information: the name of patent assignee, the 
application and grant date, and other patents that cite or are cited by the patent in question. 
The database also contains an identifier link between patent assignees and the Compustat 
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universe, so we can track the timing, quantity and quality of patents filed by a company in 
Compustat.8 
Before examining any potential impact of unobservable manager effects on firm 
innovation, we first need to control for the effects of observable manager characteristics. 
Our study obtains manager information from ExecuComp, including managers’ 
demographic information such as gender, job title, and the starting (ending) year of his or 
her tenure. We also collect information on managerial compensation from ExecuComp, 
including total salaries, bonus, and stock options that are granted and exercised, as 
managerial incentives are well documented to affect corporate performance and innovation. 
Finally, firms’ accounting information, including firm size, liquidity, profitability, capital 
structure and  investment, comes  from  Compustat; data  on  firms’  stock  returns  and  
volatility  are from CRSP. The final sample contains 75,491 firm-year observations and 
20,116 unique managers from 1992 to 2006.9  
For robustness, our analysis also employs two additional pieces of information: 
managers who die suddenly and those who are raided. The information on sudden deaths 
comes from Bereskin and Hsu (2013), Combs et al. (2007), and ExecuComp. Bereskin and 
Hsu identify a total of 16 sudden deaths, where the previous CEO died from an accident, a 
heart attack, aggressive cancer, during sleep without a disclosed cause, or a recent illness. 
Combs et al. report a total of 73 unexpected CEO deaths from firms listed on US stock 
exchanges between January 1978 and August 2001. Finally, we obtain the list of managers 
                                                          
8 For details of this database, see the website https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/ and Hall, Jae, 
and Tratjenberg (2001). 
9 We follow Chen, Huang, and Wei (2012) and start the sample period from 1993 because ExecuComp's 
coverage is incomplete in 1992, its starting year of coverage. Similarly, the sample ends in 2005 because the 
coverage of patents and citations is incomplete in 2006 in the NBER Patent Citations Database. 
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who left office due to death based on the ExecuComp variable REASON. Using the list of 
manager deaths from ExecuComp, we search LexisNexis and Proquest to identify the death 
announcement dates and classify each death according to whether the death was sudden or 
not.10 After merging the sudden deaths with the patent and firm level data, we are left with 
a sample 75 manager sudden deaths. 
In order to identify managers who were raided, we examine every single case in 
ExecuComp where the GVKEY associated with a given manager changes compared to that 
of the prior year.11 We then search LexisNexis and Proquest to examine news reports and 
firm disclosures in order identify the announcement date, the move date, and the nature of 
the manager’s move. Managers are considered to be raided if an article infers that the 
manager was raided, or if we cannot find evidence that the change in GVKEY was the 
result of a termination, acquisition, spin-off, or other reorganization event. After merging 
the sample of raided managers with the patent and firm level data, our sample consists of 
152 manager raids. 
 
2.2.2. Main Variables 
 
In this subsection, we briefly describe the main variables used in this study and 
provide their summary statistics. 
 
i. Mobility of Top Managers 
                                                          
10 We classify sudden deaths as those resulting from accidents, heart attacks, strokes, other sudden illnesses, 
or the article states the death was unexpected. 
11 We eliminate all managers that have multiple GVKEYs assigned to the same year (for example, the same 
manager in two different firms at the same time). 
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We identify the mobility of all named managers from one firm to another for all 
firms that are covered in ExecuComp database between 1993 and 2006. The selected 
sample period is constrained by the availability of patents and citations information from 
the NBER Patent Citations Database. Table 1 provides summary statistics of the mobility 
of top managers in our sample. Panel A reports the distribution of the number of times a 
manager moves. Among the 20,116 managers in our sample, 95.32% of them (i.e., 19,175) 
make zero move; that is, they stay in the same company and thus are “non-movers”. The 
remaining 4.68% (i.e., 941) serves as top executives in at least two companies and are 
therefore classified “movers”. A closer look at the distribution of these movers reveals that 
the vast majority (877 managers) moved only once, with the largest number of moves made 
by a single manager equal to 3.  Panel B shows the number of managerial moves by firm. 
Among our sample of 2,083 companies (that contain the aforementioned 20,116 managers 
and 79,491 firm-year observations), 1,059 (50.84%) do not have any movers, where the 
remaining 1,024 firms have at least one mover. Overall, the  summary  statistics  related  
to  manager  moves  are  consistent  with  those  reported by Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012).12 
 
ii. Patents and Citations 
The main variable of interest in this study is corporate innovation, which measures 
the realization of a firm’s long-term research and development investments and is an 
indicator of the firm’s long-term competitiveness. Hall, Jaffe, and Tratjenberg (2005) and 
Rossi (2006) show that corporate innovation is positively associated with a firm’s market 
value. Patents offer a rich source of information about the nature and influence of a firm’s 
                                                          
12 As in Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012) we are only able to capture manager moves within the ExecuComp 
sample due to data limitations. 
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innovation and thus are widely used in the literature as the standard measure of corporate 
innovation. In our study, we construct two measures of corporate innovation based on the 
number of patent counts: 
(1)  the natural logarithm of one plus a firm’s number of patents (LPatents), which 
is the number  of  (eventually  granted)  annual  patents  in  an  application  year  t filed  by  
firm  i,  and (2) Industry-Adjusted LPatents, defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of 
number of patents to the mean number of patents of all firms in year t and industry j. Aghion 
et al. (2013) and Hall, Jaffe, and Tratjenberg (2005) indicate that a firm’s patent citations 
provide a good measure of the value of innovations. We therefore construct two citation-
based measures: (3) LCitations, defined as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of 
total patent citations in year t by firm i, and (4) Industry Adjusted LCitations, defined as 
the logarithm of the ratio of number of citations to the mean number of citations per patent 
in year t in the same industry j. 
 
iii. Firm, Industry, and Manager Characteristics 
We follow the innovation literature and control for potential observable firm and 
industry characteristics that may affect a firm’s innovation output. These control variables 
include a firm’s size measured by total assets (Size), firm age (Age), profitability measured 
by return on assets (ROA), R&D investments (R&D), capital expenditures (Capx), asset 
tangibility (Tang), leverage (Lev), a firm’s Tobin’s Q (Q), industry concentration proxied 
by the Herfindahl index based on sales and the squared Herfindahl index (H and HH2), 
stock return (Retn), return volatility (Vol), financial constraints proxied by the Kaplan and 
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Zingales index (1997) (KZ), liquidity measured using the cash over assets ratio (Cash), and 
institutional ownership (IOwn). 
In addition, we control for observable manager characteristics documented in the 
literature. These characteristics include pay slice (the difference between a manager’s 
annual compen- sation and the median of all other managers’ annual compensation in a 
firm) (PSlice), the length of a manager’s tenure (Tenure), the sensitivity of CEO 
compensation to stock price volatility (Vega), the sensitivity of CEO compensation to stock 
prices (Delta), a female dummy (equal to one if the manager is female) (Female), a CEO 
dummy (equal to one if the manager is the CEO of the company) (CEO), and a CEO-Chair 
dummy (equal to one if the manager is both the CEO and the board chairperson of the 
company) (Chairman). Appendix A details the variable definitions. 
The AKM and MDV methodologies depend on the mobility of managers to 
separately identify firm and manager fixed effects.  Whereas the MDV method can only 
separately identify the fixed effects for managers that switch firms, the AKM method is 
able to use the information in manager moves to estimate the fixed effects for non-movers 
within the same firm. This sample of movers and connected non-mover managers is 
referred to as the connected sample. It is a subset of the full ExecuComp sample with data. 
Thus, in order to gauge the plausibility that our results, based on the connected sample, 
extend to the full sample of ExecuComp firms, Table 2 summarizes representativeness of 
the connected sample relative to the full ExecuComp sample with available data. 
Following, the methodology in Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012) we present the mean, 
median, and standard deviation of the above variables employed in our analyses for both 
the full sample and the connected sample. We then examine the quintile means and the 
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percent of firms in the connected sample that are in each quintile based on the full sample 
breakpoints. On average, firms in the connected sample are larger, more innovative, and 
have higher average stock returns than those in the full sample. For example, the average 
innovation productivity as measured by patents (citations) is 29.79 (467.24) for the 
connected sample and is 18.71 (285.66) for the full sample. Thus our results are based on 
the largest and most innovative firms. 
The connected sample of firms has an average annual stock return of 0.31, 
compared with 0.24 for the full sample. However, examining the quintiles, the connected 
and full samples look similar along this dimension. For manager-related variables, we find 
that manager characteristics in the connected sample are not vastly different from those in 
the full sample. For example, the pay slice is 0.19 for the connected sample and 0.20 for 
the full sample. The Vegas and Deltas for both samples are fairly close. Managers in the 
connected sample have an average Vega of $0.060 million and an average Delta of $0.396 
million, and those for the hold out sample are $0.047 million and $0.357 million. In general, 
the descriptive statistics are broadly similar for the two samples, suggesting that overall the 
connected sample is a fair representation of the full sample. 
Panel C of Table 2 reports the correlation matrix of the above main variables with 
the full sample presented below the diagonal and the connected sample above the diagonal. 
The size and direction of the correlation coefficients for all variables are consistent across 
the two samples of firms. We find that firms with high R&D intensity are smaller in size, 
have lower accounting performance (as measured by returns on assets), but are associated 
with larger market values (proxied by Tobin’s Q), stock return volatility, and cash holdings. 
Further, firms with higher cash holdings experience lower leverage, greater market values, 
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and larger stock return volatilities. These correlations are generally consistent with those 
documented in the existing literature. 
 
2.2.3. Empirical Methodology 
This section describes the rationale for each of our major tests.  We briefly describe 
the AKM method for the purpose of distinguishing the relative importance of unobservable 
firm and manager fixed effects. We then discuss the reasons for examining the different 
effects of manager raids and sudden deaths on corporate innovation productivity and stock 
returns. 
 
i.  AKM methodology 
To distinguish the relative importance of unobservable firm and manager fixed 
effects, we employ an approach developed by Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) for 
its capability to increase sample size and reduced the selection bias associated with only 
examining the mobility sample. 13  In the regression framework, the typical method to 
address the potential omitted variables problem (due to unobservable firm and manager 
characteristics) is to create a dummy variable for each unique firm-manager combination. 
This so-called “spell” approach mitigates possible endogeneity concerns and enhances 
explanatory power. However, it can only measure the combined influence of both firm and 
manager fixed effects without separating and gauging their relative importance. Bertrand 
and Schoar (2003) provide an alternative solution to separate these various effects by 
considering only the sample with managers who move from one company to another (these 
                                                          
13 See Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012) and Coles and Li (2012) for more details of this method. 
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managers are called movers), while including manager, firm, and year fixed effects in the 
regressions. This mover dummy variable (MDV) approach helps separate manager-fixed 
effects from firm-fixed effects, but may induce potential sample selection bias as the 
“movers” sample might comprise only a small proportion of overall observations, thus 
making it problematic to generalize the inference obtained from movers to non-movers. 
The AKM approach mitigates the small sample bias that plagues the MDV 
approach by expanding the “movers” sample to a larger “connected” sample, which 
contains both movers and non-movers. As long as a non-mover works in companies that 
hires at least one mover, she is in the “connected” sample. Therefore, a small number of 
movers can generate a larger connected sample. AKM further show that connectedness is 
the necessary and sufficient condition for separating person and firm fixed effects. As such, 
given sufficient manager mobility, using the AKM approach with a larger connected 
sample increases the precision of model   estimates. 
We apply the AKM approach to evaluating the relative importance of firm 
innovation’s determinants by estimating the following empirical model. 
 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1 =   𝐹𝑖,𝑡𝜆 + 𝑀𝑚,𝑡𝛽 + 𝜙𝑖 + 𝜃𝑚+𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                        (1) 
 
In Eq. (1), 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1 is one of our innovation measures for firm i, 𝐹𝑖,𝑡  is firm i’s 
observable characteristics, 𝑀𝑚,𝑡 is manager m’s observable attributes, 𝜙𝑖  and 𝜃𝑚  denote 
firm and manager time-invariant latent characteristics, respectively, 𝛾𝑡  represents year-
fixed effects, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the residual error. To quantify the contribution of each determinant 
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class to the total variation in firm innovation, we follow Graham, Li, and Qiu’s (2012) 
approach and decompose the model R2 as follows. 
 
𝑅2 =
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1, ?̂?𝑖,𝑡+1)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1)
 
      =
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1, 𝐹𝑖,𝑡?̂? + 𝑀𝑚,𝑡?̂? + ?̂?𝑖 + 𝜃𝑚 + 𝛾𝑡)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑦𝑖,𝑦+1)
 
      =
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1, 𝐹𝑖,𝑡?̂?)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑦𝑖,𝑦+1)
+
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1,𝑀𝑚,𝑡?̂?)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑦𝑖,𝑦+1)
+
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1, ?̂?𝑖)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑦𝑖,𝑦+1)
+
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1, 𝜃𝑚)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑦𝑖,𝑦+1)
  
      +
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1, 𝛾𝑡)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑦𝑖,𝑦+1)
                                                                                                                         (2) 
 
Note that the covariance values in Eq. (2) correspond to the fractions of the model 
sum of squares attributable to specific determinant classes. 
 
ii.  Manager raids vs. sudden deaths 
Based on the work in labor economics (Harris and Holmstrom, 1982; and Lazear, 
1986), we also assume that on average managers who are raided have greater ability than 
managers who suddenly die. 
In Harris and Holmstrom’s (1982) dynamic model, risk neutral firms partially 
insure a risk averse employees’ ability related risk via downward rigid wages. If the 
employee’s ability is revealed to be high, then the firm must revise the employee’s wage 
upward to ward off other potential employers. On the other hand, if the employee’s ability 
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is revealed to be low, then the firm is bound by contract to keep the employee and the firm 
suffers negative profits. 
In Lazear’s (1986) model, however, inter-firm mobility is determined by a 
matching process, where managers are matched to firms that can best use the managers’ 
abilities. Suppose firm A wishes to raid a high type manager, as long as the manager’s 
ability generates more value in firm A than in the manager’s current firm. Firm A will be 
able to pay the manager enough to satisfy the manager’s participation constraint. Now 
suppose firm A wishes to raid a low type manager. If the low type manager generates value 
in firm A that is below his current wage, then it is not efficient for firm A to raid the low 
type manager even though the low type manager would improve the value of firm A. That 
is, the partial insurance in the manager’s contract makes the market for low type managers 
inefficient. As pointed out by Hayes and Schaefer (1999), raids of low type managers 
would occur when the manager’s ability strongly favors the raider (in order to offset the 
partial insurance). However, raids of high type managers can occur any time. Thus, 
compared to a random sample, the average ability level of a sample of raided managers 
would be higher. 
If innovation is a highly coveted managerial ability, and thus a major determinant 
of overall manager quality, then on average we would expect a drop in firm level innovation 
productivity following manager raids compared to a random sample of manager/firm 
separations such as manager sudden deaths. Additionally, given the evidence that 
innovation improves firm value (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005), we would expect 
lower stock returns surrounding manager raids compared to those surrounding manager 
sudden deaths. This difference should be especially pronounced in highly innovative firms 
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if managers are matched to firms based on their ability to promote innovation and the 
exceptionally innovative managers are scarce. The above discussion thus motivates the two 
following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: On average, firm level patent and citation productivity are lower 
following the firm losing its manager to another firm than to sudden death. 
Hypothesis 2: On average, abnormal stock returns surrounding manager raids 
should be lower than those associated with manager sudden deaths, especially in firms 
with high innovation productivity. 
 
2.3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
2.3.1. The Determinants of Firm Innovation 
We begin our analysis by examining the determinants of firm innovation using the 
full sample of ExecuComp firms with available data. We regress firm innovation on a set 
of observable firm-level variables that have previously been found to be significant 
determinants of firm innovation. We employ our earlier defined proxies for firm innovation: 
the number of patents and the number of citations. Drawn from the existing literature, the 
determinants of innovation are firm size (Size), return on assets (ROA), research and 
development  (R&D),  capital  expenditure  (Capx),  tangible assets (Tang), leverage (Lev), 
Tobin’s Q (Q), a firm’s Herfindahl index (HH), the square of the Herfindahl index (HH2), 
stock return (Retn), stock volatility (Vol), Kaplan and Zingales’s (1997) measurement of a 
firm’s reliance on external financing (KZ), liquidity (Cash), institutional ownership (IOwn), 
the natural logarithm of firm age (Age), pay slice (PSlice), the natural logarithm of a 
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manager’s tenure at the firm (Tenure), Vega, and Delta, a dummy indicator if the manager 
is a female (Female), a CEO (CEO), and a dummy indicator if the manager is a CEO who 
also holds the position of chairman of the board (Chairman). 
Table 3 reports results from pooled OLS regressions, regressions including firm 
fixed effects, Manager fixed effects, and finally both firm and manager fixed effects are 
included in the model. All regression models include year fixed effects to capture 
unobservable variation in economic environments and other plausible year differences 
related to firm innovation. In Models 1 and 2, we focus only on the explanatory power of 
observable firm and managerial attributes and hence, estimate the models without firm and 
manager fixed effects. The adjusted R2s of these models are between 33.8% and 32.7%. 
However, when we account for unobservable time invariant firm heterogeneity by 
incorporating firm fixed effects into Models 3 and 4, their adjusted R2 increases 
correspondingly to 83.3% and 74.4%. Similarly, adding manager instead of firm fixed 
effects to Models 5 and 6 also improves the adjusted R2 to 83.4%-76.1%. When we 
incorporate both firm and manager fixed effects using the “Spell” method in models 7 and 
8, the explanatory power goes up to 85.9% and 78.4%. These results suggest that the firm 
and manager attributes explain the majority of the variation in corporate innovation 
measured in terms of the number of patents and the number of citations. They also indicate 
that unobservable time invariant firm (for e.g., firm culture, firm quality, firm environment, 
among others) and managerial qualities (for e.g., managerial leadership quality, managerial 
creativity, talents, and abilities, etc.) play a much more important role in explaining firm 
innovation than observable firm and managerial characteristics. 
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To put our results into perspective, we compare them with those of the existing 
literature and find the explanatory powers of observable and unobservable determinants of 
firm innovation to be broadly consistent with the adjusted R2s reported in prior studies. For 
example, Atanassov (2013) shows that about 83.1% (61.8%) of the cross-sectional 
variation in innovation measured in terms of the number of patents (citations) can be 
explained by the dummy variables that capture the passing of antitakeover laws, firm 
control variables, and time and firm fixed effects for the 1976-2000 period. Shen and Zhang 
(2013) find that promotion-based tournament incentives affect firm innovation (measured 
by the number of patents and patent citations granted in t to t + 3) during the 1993-2002 
period. With industry and year fixed effects incorporated, their model specifications 
generate an adjusted R2 of 46.3%-55.6%; the adjusted R2 value increases in the length of 
time patents are filed or citations are received. He and Tian (2013) obtain an adjusted R2 
of 83.3% in their regression of firm innovation on analyst coverage, firm control variables, 
and firm and year fixed effects for the 1993-2005 period. Coles and Li (2013) evaluate the 
relative importance of observed and unobserved firm and manager specific characteristics 
in explaining a host of corporate policies, including R&D. For models with R&D as the 
dependent variable, their adjusted R2s are 28% (without firm and manager fixed effects), 
77% (with firm fixed effects) and 78% (with manager fixed effects). 
Overall, the substantially improved adjusted R2s in the estimated model 
specifications with time invariant firm and managerial qualities suggest that compared with 
their observable counterparts, these unobservable qualities have a significantly larger 
explanatory power for firm innovation. Aditionally, it is worth noting that several of the 
coefficients change dramatically when including firm and/or manager fixed effects in the 
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model. For example, the economic importance of Size, ROA, R&D, Lev, Cash, and CEO 
are reduced when including firm and/or manager fixed effects while Capx, HH, HH2, Vol, 
switch signs. These differences across models underscore the importance of controlling for 
unobserved firm and manager qualities when studying the determinants of corporate 
innovation productivity. Finally, comparing models 3 and 4 (firm fixed effects) to models 
7 and 8 (firm and manager fixed effects) we see much smaller differences in the 
aforementioned coefficients, this may suggest that firm fixed effects are more important 
than manager fixed effects in explaining corporate innovation than manager fixed effects. 
However, because the “Spell” methodology is unable to separately identify firm and 
manager fixed effects. We thus turn our attention to the connected sample in order to 
separately identify the importance of firm and manager fixed effects in determining 
corporate innovation productivity. 
 
2.3.2. Relative Importance of Firm and Managerial Attributes 
In the preceding section, we have established the significant role of unobservable 
firm and managerial qualities for firm innovation. We now turn to evaluating their relative 
importance by conducting AKM regressions on the connected subsample. All our AKM 
regressions reported in Table 4 include the observable variables employed in Table 3, as 
well as firm and/or manager and year fixed effects. Similar to Table 3, Table 4 also shows 
a larger model R2 for estimated specifications using the number of patents than the number 
of citations as the innovation proxy. It is also worth noting that the magnitudes of the 
coefficients in Table 3 are similar to those in Table 4 further assuaging concerns related to 
the representativeness of the connected sample. 
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Panel B of Table 4 presents the R-squared decomposition of models 7 and 8 
estimated using the AKM method. The model R2 is decomposed according to expression 
(2) above that allows us to compute the component normalized covariance with the 
dependent variable and percentage of the model R2 attributable to each class of 
determinants, namely firm fixed effects, manager fixed effects, observable components, 
which include observable time variant variables and the year fixed effects, and residuals. 
firm fixed effects contribute the most to the model R2, with its normalized covariance 
representing 52.58% and 48.30% of the explained variation in firm innovation, whereas 
manager fixed effects contribute 30.89% and 30.21% depending on the measure of 
innovation examined. The observable time variant characteristics, together contribute 
16.53% and 21.49% of the model R2. These findings suggest that compared to firm effects, 
manager effects, while still significant, play a less important role in explaining firm 
innovation. 
We next perform several robustness tests that broadly confirm our main results. As 
discussed in Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012) the AKM method relies on the information about 
movers to determine the non-mover fixed effects. Limited mobility within the sample will 
result in noisy estimates of the non-mover fixed effects. That is they may not be “truly 
purged of firm-level influences.” Thus the contribution of manager fixed effects to model 
R2 estimated above may be overstated. In order to address this concern we conduct the 
analysis in Table 4 using the MDV methodology on the mobility sample. It should be noted 
that the mobility sample contains the same firms as the connected sample, but, it does not 
contain the non-mover managers and is thus free from the potential contamination issue 
discussed above. 
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The results from the regressions using the MDV approach are reported in Table 5. 
The regression results in Table 5 are broadly consistent with those reported in Table 4. One 
notable, exception is that the R2 in the manager fixed effects regressions (models 5 and 6) 
is much lower than that reported in the firm fixed effects regressions (models 3 and 4). This 
result suggests that manager fixed effects explain less of the variation in innovation 
productivity than firm fixed effects. Indeed, the R2 decomposition in Panel B of Table 5 
shows a stark contrast in the explanatory power of 
firm and manager fixed effects. Firm fixed effects contribute 70.78% and 69.76% while 
manager effects contribute only 15.85% and 13.21% to model R2 where the dependent 
variable is LPatents and LCitations respectively. The results are consistent with manager 
fixed effects playing a much smaller role in innovation productivity compared to firm fixed 
effects. 
It is plausible that our results may be driven by the sample of low innovative firms 
or firms with no patents. That is, if managers are matched to firms based on their ability to 
innovate then our estimate of firm and manager fixed effects as well as the coefficients on 
the time varying observable characteristics are biased as the omitted variables related to 
matching are likely to be correlated with innovation productivity. To rule out this 
possibility, we replicate our results using the sample of firms within the connected sample 
that were assigned at least one patent during the sample period. The results are reported in 
the top panel of Table 6. Broadly consistent with the original results, firm fixed effects 
account for 41.59% and 30.04% of the variation in innovation productivity. While, 
manager fixed effects account for 28.09% and 30.95%. The observable variables together 
with year fixed effects constitute 30.32% and 39.01% of the model R2. 
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The results using this subsample with patents suggest a smaller difference in the 
importance of firm and manager fixed effects in explaining innovation productivity, 
however they are consistent with our main results that managers are important but, firm 
characteristics may matter slightly more. By examining only firms with patents we 
eliminate some of the matching concerns, i.e. that our results are driven by differences in 
omitted time varying variables due to firm/manager matching in firms with and without 
patents.14 As in Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012), we acknowledge that a test of this nature 
cannot completely eliminate matching concerns. However, Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012) 
also point out that if matching is based on unobservable time invariant firm and manager 
characteristics than including both firm and manager fixed effects should address the 
problem. 
We also conduct two other tests to ensure the robustness of our main findings. It is 
plausible that the main results are driven by chief financial officers (CFOs) or other named 
executive officers (NEOs), who are not expected to contribute to innovation. It should be 
noted that we include CEO dummies in all of our regressions to control for the importance 
of this position. However, to further examine this possibility, we conduct the same analysis 
using only the connected sample of CEOs. As shown in the middle panel of Table 6, CEO 
fixed effects appear to explain the majority of the variation in innovation productivity in 
this subsample. CEO fixed effects account for 50.09% and 50.53% of the variation while 
                                                          
14 Following Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012) we also run several tests were we restrict the sample to managers 
that move to firms with similar average patent productivity. The unreported results of these test suggest that 
manager fixed effects matter more than firm fixed effects. However, the majority 75% of the firms in these 
test have no patent productivity so they are difficult to interpret as patenting firms are likely to be different 
than non-patenting firms. If we eliminate those firms without patents we are left with on the order of 30 
managers and 60 firms. Thus we do not believe that these results are representative of the entire sample of 
firms. Specifically, we run four separate analyses excluding movers if the average firm level patent 
productivity during their tenure in the new firm is 10%, 15%, 20%, or 25% different from the average firm 
level patent productivity during their tenure in their old firm. 
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firm fixed effects only account for 25.71% and 26.43%. However after controlling for 
unobservable differences between firms with and without patents, the bottom panel of 
Table 6 reports that CEO fixed effects account for 26.72% and 34.93% of model R2 while 
firm fixed effects account for 46.82% and 38.41%. The results of these CEO subsample 
tests are again broadly consistent with our main findings CEOs matter, but firms 
characteristics appear to matter more especially after controlling for differences in firms 
with and without patents. 
The overall evidence is consistent with our earlier quote from Collins and Porras 
(2002) that a firm’s success relies “at least in part” on its “underlying processes and 
fundamental dynamics” and is not primarily the result of a single executive, who has great 
ideas and made good decisions, is charismatic, and has led with authority. Our finding of 
the importance of firm attributes relative to managerial attributes in explaining firm 
innovation productivity is also in accord with the results shown by Kaplan, Sensoy, and 
Stromberg (2009). These authors find that the success of startup companies depends more 
on the business than on the management. They argue that their findings are in line with the 
views of Hart and Moore (1994) and Holmstrom (1999) that nonhuman capital assets, such 
as identifiable lines of business and intellectual property, are critical for the early stage of 
a firm’s life and that they remain relatively stable even as specific human capital assets 
turnover. 15  In line with their arguments, our results therefore suggest that a firm’s 
innovation productivity still depends on the same, perhaps broadened, business and firm 
expertise it had when it started. 
                                                          
15 They cite examples such as, Apple, eBay, Cisco, and Google that are in the same businesses they started 
in, but are managed by non-founders after their start up. 
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On the other hand, our findings contrast those of prior studies. For example, 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) find that manager fixed effects matter for a number of 
corporate decisions, including investment, R&D, financial, and organizational practices.  
Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012) also reach a similar conclusion in their analysis of executive 
compensation determinants. However, Coles and Li (2012) show that the importance of 
unobservable manager and firm fixed effects varies with the type of corporate issue in 
question. For example, unobservable manager characteristics can explain a large extent of 
the heterogeneity in executive wealth-performance sensitivity, board independence, board 
size, and sensitivity of expected executive compensation to firm risk, whereas unobserved 
firm attributes contribute to a large proportion of variation explained for dividend payout, 
antitakeover defenses, book and market leverage, and corporate cash holdings. 
 
2.3.3. Evidence from Manager Raids/Sudden Deaths 
This section applies a concept  from  labor  economics  to  test  the  robustness  of  
our  key  finding that a firm’s underlying processes and fundamentals play a more critical 
role than management in determining corporate innovation. We construct two samples of 
firms that allow us to evaluate the managerial contribution to corporate innovation: one 
sample consists of firms whose managers are raided by other firms, and another consists 
of firms whose managers die suddenly. As we discussed in Section 2.3 above, the sample 
of raided managers is not random, but the sample of sudden deaths ought to be random. 
We then  examine  the  innovation  productivity  of  the  firm  around  the  time when its 
manager is being raided by another firm versus when its manager dies suddenly. Labor 
economists argue that the average ability of a sample of managers who are raided should 
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be higher than a sample of firms where the manager dies suddenly. Hence, comparing 
corporate innovation productivity or cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) across these 
groups should provide a measure of the differences in managerial ability. However, if the 
ability to promote innovation is not a major determinant of manager quality, we should not 
see differences between these two groups. 
 
2.3.3.1. Innovation productivity and manager raids/sudden deaths 
We first evaluate the effects of manager raids/sudden deaths on innovation 
productivity (measured in terms of the number of patents and the number of patent citations 
as well as with industry-adjusted patents and citations) by regressing innovation 
productivity on the indicator variables Post, Raid, and their interaction, Post×Raid. Post 
equals 1 for the two years following the raid/sudden death year and 0 for the two years 
prior to the raid/sudden death year. Raid equals 1 if a manager is raided by another public 
company and 0 if a manager dies suddenly. One potential issue with this analysis is that 
the departing manager may have contributed to the patents filed by the firm following the 
manager’s departure, which would contaminate our results. In order to mitigate this 
concern, we employ a two-year lag for manager raids/sudden deaths relative to the patent 
filing year. Additionally, we exclude the filing year that is two years following the 
manager’s departure, as this year most likely contains a combination of the old and new 
managers’ contributions to the firm’s innovation productivity. For example, if a manager 
is raided in 1999, we compare the raided firm’s innovation productivity in 1999 and 2000 
to that in 2002 and 2003. Furthermore, we control for various firm attributes that were used 
in Table 4; however, managerial attributes are excluded from these regressions because 
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ExecuComp has limited or no information on these managerial variables (PSlice, Tenure, 
Vega, and Delta) for the sample of firms whose managers are raided and whose managers 
die suddenly before 1992. These firm-specific variables are defined in the appendix. All 
regressions are estimated with year and industry fixed effects, and the t-statistics associated 
with regression coefficients are reported in parentheses. The regression results are reported 
in Table 7. 
The coefficient on the interaction term Post×Raid is negative, suggesting that the 
productivity of a firm will fall more when its manager is being raided by another firm than 
when its manager dies suddenly, consistent with the manager’s ability to innovate being an 
important determinant of quality. However, the coefficient on Post×Raid is not 
significantly different from zero, which implies no statistical difference between the effects 
of manager raids versus sudden deaths on corporate innovation productivity.  These 
findings are maintained even after we adjust the measure of the change in a firm’s 
productivity to account for industry productivity. Hence, the overall evidence indicates that 
firm level attributes, and perhaps to a lesser extent manager attributes, play an important 
role in encouraging corporate innovation. 
 
2.3.3.2. Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and manager raids/sudden deaths 
We now turn to assessing managerial contributions by examining the effects of 
manager raids/sudden deaths on a firm’s CAR across different levels of innovation 
productivity. We employ four different benchmarks in measuring the firm’s CAR:  (i) the 
market-adjusted return, (ii) the market model, (iii) the Fama-French 3-factor model, and 
(iv) the Fama-French 4-factor model. 
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For all the above models, except the market-adjusted returns, we estimate the 
parameters over a 150-day period, which ends two weeks before CAR is computed. We 
define Day 0 as the date at which a manager raid or sudden death is announced, and CAR 
is computed between Day -2 and Day 2. For the market model, we regress a firm’s stock 
return against the corresponding market return to obtain the regression parameters. For the 
Fama-French 3-factor model, we regress a firm’s stock return against the corresponding 
three factors (i.e., the market, size, and book-to-market factors) to obtain the regression 
parameters, and for their 4-factor model, we include the fourth factor, the momentum 
factor.16 Finally, for the market-adjusted returns, we compute the abnormal return as the 
difference between the stock return and market return and accumulate the abnormal return 
over Day -2 to Day 2. 
Our sample consists of 152 manager raids and 75 manager sudden deaths. We 
divide these 227 firms into high and low innovative firms based on their total number of 
patents for the two years prior to a manager raid or a sudden death. A firm is assigned to a 
high-innovative group (High) if the number of its patents is larger than the median number 
of patents for the 227 firms.  Similarly, if a firm’s number of patents is equal or lower than 
the median, it falls into a low-innovative group (Low). Of the 152 firms whose managers 
depart for a similar position at another firm, 74 are low innovative firms and 78 are high 
innovative firms. Of the 75 firms whose managers die suddenly, 56 are low innovative 
firms and 19 are high innovative firms.  We compute the cross-sectional average of the 5 
Day CAR associated with each type of innovative firms and also the difference in CARs 
                                                          
16 All the daily returns on these factors are obtained from Ken French's website. 
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between firms with manager raids and those with sudden deaths within the high and low 
innovative firms. Results are reported in Table 8. 
On average, the 5-day CAR for firms with manager raids is consistently negative, 
whereas the 5- day CAR for firms with manager sudden deaths is mostly positive. For 
example, the 5-day CAR for manager raids is between -0.8% (Low innovative firms based 
on the Fama-French 3-factor approach) and -1.3% (High innovative firms based on the 
Fama-French 3-factor approach), suggesting that the market reaction is unfavorable when 
a firm loses its manager to another firm. On the other hand, the 5-day CAR for manager 
sudden deaths varies from -0.6% (High innovative firms based on the market model) to 
1.6% (High innovative firms based on the Fama-French 4-factor approach), implying that 
the market reacts somewhat favorably when a firm suddenly loses its manager. While the 
difference in the market reaction between manager raids and manager deaths is 
insignificant, the results are broadly consistent with those obtained by Hayes and Schaefer 
(1999). These findings suggest that on average raided managers are of higher quality, 
compared with the quality of managers who die suddenly.17 Finally, if managers’ are 
matched to firms based on their ability to innovate and exceptionally innovative managers 
are scarce, we would expect that the difference between CARs surrounding manager deaths 
and raids would be higher for high innovative firms compared to low innovative firms. The 
last row of Table 8 indicates no statistical difference in the CARs surrounding manager 
raids and manager deaths between firms with high and low innovation productivity. 
                                                          
17 Hayes and Schaefer (1999) report that manager raids are accompanied by an average abnormal return of -
1:87%, while manager deaths are associated with an average abnormal return of +2:84% using a (-1, +1) day 
event window. 
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In Table 9, we reexamine the results of Table 8 in a multivariate setting. 
Specifically, we regress the 5-Day CAR on the previously defined indicator variable Raid, 
a high-innovative variable HInnov, the interaction between Raid and HInnov, and all the 
control variables employed in Table 7. HInnov equals one if the firm belongs to a highly 
innovative group and 0 if otherwise. All regressions include fixed effects and the t-statistics 
are computed based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. To conserve space, 
we present only the coefficients of these three key variables, together with their t-statistics.  
While the results show a consistently negative coefficient on the interaction term, 
consistent with the ability to innovate being a major determinant of manager quality, none 
of the coefficients is statistically significant at conventional levels. The multivariate results 
therefore suggest that while managers’ ability to innovate may be an important quality it is 
not as important as other firm level characteristics. In summary, the evidence suggests that 
that firm characteristics, and to a lesser extent managerial ability, explain a large portion 
of the heterogeneity in firm level innovation productivity. 
 
2.4. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we analyze the relative importance of firm and managerial attributes 
in determining corporate innovation productivity. A firm’s innovation productivity is less 
likely to be manipulated by managers and thus serves as a less biased performance metric 
compared to traditional accounting-based performance measures.  Using the AKM 
approach that calculates proportions of R2 attributable to different firm and manager 
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characteristics, we find that firm characteristics dominate manager characteristics in 
explaining the heterogeneity in innovation productivity. 
We conduct several robustness tests to ensure that the finding is not driven by 
managers who are not expected to contribute to innovation (such as non-CEOs). We also 
do not find that our results are due to unobservable differences between firms with and 
with our patents. We also provide evidence using manager/firm separations that on average 
managers’ ability to innovate is not a major determinant of manager quality or innovation 
productivity. 
Finally, we don’t want to under represent the role the managers play in innovation 
productivity. As shown in all of our results manager fixed effects are generally nearly as 
important as firm fixed effects. However, we would caution investors and corporate 
insiders that hiring the next Steve Jobs may not improve innovation productivity if the 
firms underlying traits and characteristics such as the firm culture, product nature, and 
competitiveness are not also conducive to innovation. 
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Table 1 
Mobility of Top Managers 
 
This table shows the number of top managers who move (i.e., movers) or stay in our sample of 
firms. Panel A reports the number (percentage) of managers that move to another firm within 
the sample, and Panel B presents the number of firms with mobile managers. The sample 
period is from 1992 to 2006. 
 
 
Panel A: Number of Times a Manager Moves 
Number of Moves Made Number of Managers % 
0 19,175 95.32 
Number of Non-Movers 19,175 95.32 
1 877 4.36 
2 59 0.29 
3 5 0.02 
Number of Movers 941 4.68 
Total Number of Managers 20,116 100.00 
Panel B: Number of Managerial Moves in a Firm 
Number of Movers in a Firm Number of Firms % 
0 1,059 50.84 
1-5 647 31.06 
6-10 241 11.57 
11-20 117 5.62 
21-30 15 0.72 
31-50 4 0.19 
Total 2,083 100.00 
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Table 2 
Representativeness of the Connected Sample 
 
This table reports summary statistics of the major variables used in our analysis. Patent 
information comes from the NBER patent data set provided by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 
(2001). This data set includes the number of patents by each firm and the number of citations 
received by each patent. Variable definitions are reported in the appendix. It provides the 
average, median, and standard deviation of each variable in the full and connected samples 
(i.e., the sample firms connected by mobile managers). It also shows the quintile averages of 
each variable and the percent of firms from the connected sample in each quintile. Quintiles are 
formed using the full sample. 
 
Panel A: Representativeness of continuous variables       
        Average and % in each quintile 
Variable Mean Median SD 1 2 3 4 5 
Patents                 
Full 18.71 0.00 117.57   0.00   2.53 94.95 
Connected 29.79 0.00 155.88   0.00   2.56 115.57 
Connected %         56.50   18.10 25.40 
                  
Citations                  
Full 285.66 0.00 2337.61   0.00   19.72 1417.84 
Connected 467.24 0.00 3137.81   0.00   20.78 1793.65 
Connected %         63.80   10.30 25.90 
                  
Total assets                 
 Full 4493.17 814.80 19635.31 152.53 404.31 845.60 2085.94 18979.19 
Connected 6339.80 1289.66 21241.72 155.03 404.85 858.10 2132.76 20266.99 
Connected %       13.90 16.00 19.00 23.50 27.60 
                  
ROA                 
Full 0.14 0.14 0.13 -0.02 0.11 0.14 0.19 0.28 
Connected 0.13 0.14 0.14 -0.02 0.11 0.14 0.19 0.27 
Connected %       20.50 20.10 20.50 19.80 19.10 
                  
R&D                  
Full 0.04 0.00 0.08   0.00 0.01 0.04 0.15 
Connected 0.04 0.01 0.08   0.00 0.01 0.03 0.15 
Connected %         43.70 11.60 21.70 23.00 
                  
Capx                  
Full 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.16 
Connected 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.16 
Connected %       17.80 20.50 21.10 20.90 19.80 
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Table 2 - Continued 
              
        Average and % in each quintile 
Variable Mean Median SD 1 2 3 4 5 
Tang                  
Full 0.31 0.25 0.22 0.07 0.16 0.25 0.39 0.67 
Connected 0.31 0.26 0.21 0.07 0.16 0.25 0.39 0.66 
Connected %       18.80 19.80 20.20 20.70 20.50 
                  
Lev                 
Full 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.00 0.09 0.20 0.31 0.50 
Connected 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.00 0.09 0.21 0.31 0.49 
Connected %       17.40 18.60 21.50 22.00 20.50 
                  
Q                 
Full 2.21 1.66 1.93 1.02 1.34 1.67 2.25 4.77 
Connected 2.21 1.65 2.06 1.02 1.34 1.67 2.25 4.86 
Connected %       19.60 20.70 20.40 19.90 19.40 
                  
HH                 
Full 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.14 
Connected 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.15 
Connected %       21.40 19.50 20.20 19.40 19.60 
                  
HH2                 
Full 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
Connected 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 
Connected %       21.40 19.50 20.20 19.40 19.60 
                  
Retn                  
Full 0.24 0.03 12.46 -0.49 -0.17 0.03 0.25 1.58 
Connected 0.31 0.03 16.94 -0.50 -0.17 0.03 0.25 1.96 
Connected %       20.10 19.90 20.40 19.90 19.70 
                  
Vol                  
Full 0.47 0.40 0.24 0.23 0.32 0.41 0.53 0.83 
Connected 0.46 0.39 0.23 0.23 0.32 0.41 0.53 0.83 
Connected %       22.10 20.40 19.50 18.50 19.50 
                  
KZ                 
Full -4.36 -0.83 59.10 -20.87 -3.19 -0.86 0.49 2.63 
Connected -4.05 -0.78 78.54 -20.23 -3.18 -0.87 0.49 2.92 
Connected %       19.70 19.50 20.00 19.10 21.70 
 
 
       
74 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 - Continued               
        Average and % in each quintile 
Variable Mean Median SD 1 2 3 4 5 
Cash                  
Full 0.14 0.07 0.18 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.17 0.45 
Connected 0.14 0.06 0.18 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.17 0.44 
Connected %       20.50 20.00 20.80 18.80 20.00 
                  
IOwn                  
Full 0.62 0.64 0.21 0.31 0.52 0.64 0.74 0.90 
Connected 0.64 0.66 0.20 0.31 0.52 0.64 0.74 0.89 
Connected %       16.50 19.00 21.10 22.30 21.00 
                  
Age                 
Full 22.00 16.00 18.60 4.80 9.90 16.75 28.04 52.77 
Connected 24.32 17.00 20.59 4.80 9.88 16.72 28.11 54.51 
Connected %       21.60 17.80 18.30 17.30 24.90 
                  
PSlice                 
 Full 0.20 0.16 0.13 0.07 0.12 0.16 0.23 0.41 
Connected 0.19 0.15 0.13 0.07 0.12 0.16 0.22 0.42 
Connected %       22.70 20.60 19.20 18.00 19.60 
                  
Tenure                 
 Full 9.02 7.00 7.38 3.54 5.69 6.96 8.68 20.53 
Connected 8.66 6.78 7.24 3.49 5.68 6.96 8.68 20.81 
Connected %       25.00 18.10 19.70 19.40 17.80 
                  
Vega                 
 Full 47.41 13.19 176.39 1.31 5.89 13.51 31.28 185.04 
Connected 60.24 17.36 218.91 1.35 5.97 13.58 31.66 195.80 
Connected %       15.60 17.70 19.80 21.80 25.20 
                  
Delta                 
 Full 357.44 47.48 5655.6
2 
6.12 21.17 48.71 118.80 1592.40 
Connected 396.12 54.31 6170.2
8 
6.23 21.20 48.97 119.11 1647.61 
Connected %       17.40 19.20 20.10 21.70 21.60 
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Table 2 - Continued 
Panel B: Representativeness of Indicator variables 
Variable  Mean Median SD 
Female Full 0.04 0.00 0.20 
 
Connected 0.04 0.00 0.20 
CEO Full 0.18 0.00 0.39 
 
Connected 0.18 0.00 0.39 
Chairman Full 0.15 0.00 0.36 
 Connected 0.15 0.00 0.36 
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Panel C: Correlation Matrix 
 
This table presents the correlation matrix of the variables used in our analysis. Patent information comes from the NBER patent data set 
provided by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001). Variable definitions are reported in the appendix. This data set includes the number of 
patents by each firm and the number of citations received by each patent. Pearson correlation coefficients within the hold out sample are 
above the diagonal and those within the connectedness sample are below the diagonal. ∗ indicate significance at the 5% levels. 
 
 
 
Var. 
 
Size 
 
ROA 
 
R&D 
 
Capx 
 
Tang 
 
Lev 
 
Q 
 
HH 
 
HH2 
 
Retn 
 
Vol 
 
KZ 
 
Cash 
 
IOwn 
 
Age 
 
PSlice 
 
Tenure 
 
Vega 
 
Delta 
 
Female 
 
CEO 
 
Chairman 
 
Size 
  
0.19∗∗∗ 
 
-0.30∗∗∗ 
 
-0.03∗∗∗ 
 
0.23∗∗∗ 
 
0.25∗∗∗ 
 
-0.16∗∗∗ 
 
0.02∗∗∗ 
 
0.02∗∗∗ 
 
0.01∗∗ 
 
-0.42∗∗∗ 
 
0.04∗∗∗ 
 
-0.38∗∗∗ 
 
0.16∗∗∗ 
 
0.44∗∗∗ 
 
-0.04∗∗∗ 
 
0.18∗∗∗ 
 
0.26∗∗∗ 
 
0.07∗∗∗ 
 
-0.03∗∗∗ 
 
0.02∗∗∗ 
 
0.08∗∗∗ 
ROA 0.14∗∗∗  -0.47
∗∗∗
 0.15∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01∗ 0.00 -0.39∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.01∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.00 0.01∗∗ 
R&D -0.27∗∗∗ -0.46∗∗∗  -0.03
∗∗∗
 -0.26∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.03∗∗∗ -0.00 0.37∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.13∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.04∗∗∗ 
Capx -0.05∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗  0.61
∗∗∗
 0.04∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.09∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ 0.01∗ 0.07∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗ 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Tang 0.20∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗  0.29
∗∗∗
 -0.17∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.31∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ -0.43∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.00 0.17∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ 0.00 0.02∗∗∗ 
Lev 0.28∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗  -0.19
∗∗∗
 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01 0.00 -0.15∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ -0.42∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ -0.01∗ 0.03∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ 0.00 0.02∗∗∗ 
Q -0.16∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗  -0.05
∗∗∗
 -0.04∗∗∗ 0.00 0.20∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.20∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.02∗∗∗ 
HH 0.01∗ -0.03∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗  0.91
∗∗∗
 -0.01 -0.08∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.05∗∗∗ -0.00 0.11∗∗∗ -0.00 0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.00 0.01 
HH2 0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.03∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗  -0.00 -0.05
∗∗∗
 -0.00 -0.03∗∗∗ 0.01∗ 0.08∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01∗ 
Retn 0.01∗ 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01∗ -0.01 -0.00  0.02
∗∗∗
 -0.00 0.02∗∗ 0.00 -0.04∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.01∗∗ -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 
Vol -0.39∗∗∗ -0.34∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗  -0.04
∗∗∗
 0.54∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -0.42∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.24∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ 0.01 0.04∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.06∗∗∗ 
KZ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.04∗∗∗  -0.10
∗∗∗
 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 
Cash -0.36∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -0.41∗∗∗ -0.41∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.00 0.02∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗  -0.02
∗∗∗
 -0.28∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.17∗∗∗ -0.01 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.06∗∗∗ 
IOwn 0.24∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -0.01∗ -0.00 -0.02∗∗∗ -0.00 0.00 -0.08∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗  0.02
∗∗∗
 -0.01∗ 0.00 0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.01∗ 0.01∗ 
Age 0.45∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.39∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗  -0.03
∗∗∗
 0.20∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 
PSlice -0.06∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.00 0.01∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗  0.10
∗∗∗
 0.19∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 
Tenure 0.14∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.01∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.01∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗  0.08
∗∗∗
 0.05∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 
Vega 0.28∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ 0.01∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.01∗ -0.00 -0.00 -0.05∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.01∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗  0.16
∗∗∗
 -0.02∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 
Delta 0.07∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.01∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ 0.00 0.03∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗  -0.01 0.06
∗∗∗
 0.06∗∗∗ 
Female -0.03∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.00 -0.01∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.00 0.01 0.04∗∗∗ -0.00 0.04∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01∗  -0.07
∗∗∗
 -0.07∗∗∗ 
CEO 0.02∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗  0.68
∗∗∗
 
Chairman 0.08∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.00 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.06∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.05∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗  
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Table 3 
Determinants of Corporate Innovation Productivity (Full Sample) 
This table presents the regression results on the determinants of corporate innovation productivity 
using the full sample. The results are from pooled OLS regressions with year fixed effects only and 
also with combinations of other fixed effects. All regressions are estimated with year fixed effects, 
and variable definitions are reported in Appendix A. All regressions are estimated with year fixed effects. 
The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. 
 
Pooled OLS Firm Fixed Effects 
Manager Fixed 
Effects 
Firm and Manager 
Fixed Effects 
 LPatents LCitations LPatents LCitations LPatents LCitations LPatents LCitations 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 
Size 
 
0.429*** 
 
0.563*** 
 
0.168*** 
 
0.197*** 
 
0.265*** 
 
0.367*** 
 
0.183*** 
 
0.254*** 
 (14.95) (14.30) (5.90) (3.37) (12.46) (9.33) (7.68) (5.17) 
ROA 1.680*** 2.764*** 0.170 0.653*** 0.179* 0.538*** 0.075 0.381* 
 (7.23) (7.57) (1.40) (2.61) (1.84) (2.66) (0.76) (1.82) 
R&D 6.649*** 10.640*** 0.696** 1.500*** 0.629*** 1.281*** 0.269 0.834* 
 (10.93) (10.93) (2.29) (2.64) (2.72) (2.79) (1.18) (1.76) 
Capx 1.108*** 1.628*** -0.045 -0.252 0.000 -0.135 -0.0534 -0.234 
 (2.89) (2.71) (-0.29) (-0.70) (0.00) (-0.47) (-0.41) (-0.81) 
Tang -0.925*** -1.463*** 0.440*** 1.135*** 0.156 0.591** 0.378*** 0.974*** 
 (-6.37) (-6.85) (2.73) (3.25) (1.14) (2.29) (2.78) (3.43) 
Lev -0.440*** -0.780*** -0.125 -0.337** -0.157** -0.372*** -0.090 -0.278** 
 (-3.84) (-4.38) (-1.49) (-1.98) (-2.29) (-2.75) (-1.30) (-1.99) 
Q 0.027** 0.045** 0.030*** 0.055*** 0.032*** 0.053*** 0.027*** 0.044*** 
 (2.35) (2.44) (4.79) (4.60) (5.36) (4.65) (4.34) (3.75) 
HH 2.967*** 4.710*** -1.184 -1.544 -0.585 -0.751 -1.388** -2.329* 
 (3.11) (3.28) (-1.59) (-0.87) (-0.89) (-0.61) (-2.25) (-1.65) 
HH2 -2.902** -4.868** -0.089 -2.461 1.231 1.355 0.621 -0.023 
 (-2.00) (-2.33) (-0.10) (-1.11) (1.21) (0.77) (0.85) (-0.01) 
Retn -0.000 0.000 -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.013 
 (-1.32) (1.03) (-8.39) (-6.81) (0.17) (0.78) (0.12) (1.05) 
Vol 0.346*** 0.429** -0.032 -0.265 -0.091 -0.423** -0.082 -0.395** 
 (2.82) (2.36) (-0.43) (-1.48) (-1.62) (-2.57) (-1.42) (-2.24) 
KZ 0.000 0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.91) (1.00) (-1.97) (-0.99) (-1.78) (-0.99) (-1.41) (-0.84) 
Cash 0.349** 0.551** 0.037 0.024 0.057 0.083 0.088 0.154 
 (2.26) (2.18) (0.31) (0.10) (0.62) (0.44) (0.94) (0.80) 
IOwn -0.145 0.040 0.208*** 0.425*** 0.016 0.108 0.107* 0.247* 
 (-1.25) (0.22) (2.92) (2.72) (0.27) (0.91) (1.81) (1.96) 
Log(Age) 0.241*** 0.351*** 0.139** 0.223** 0.171*** 0.203*** 0.094** 0.075 
 (7.19) (7.05) (2.53) (2.20) (4.71) (3.31) (2.22) (0.89) 
PSlice 0.033 0.028 0.000 0.013 -0.041 -0.025 0.030 0.109 
 (0.71) (0.35) (0.02) (0.30) (-1.07) (-0.33) (0.89) (1.53) 
Log(Tenure) 0.014 0.001 0.015* 0.027 -0.037* -0.025 -0.027 -0.034 
 (0.60) (0.04) (1.70) (1.64) (-1.70) (-0.59) (-1.20) (-0.71) 
Vega -0.000 -0.000** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** 
 (-1.15) (-2.19) (-2.39) (-2.65) (-2.78) (-3.51) (-3.59) (-3.98) 
Delta -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 
 (-0.40) (-0.61) (1.09) (0.57) (1.68) (0.27) (3.10) (0.83) 
Female -0.141*** -0.253*** 0.003 0.011     
 (-3.82) (-4.60) (0.18) (0.38)     
CEO 0.029 0.069** 0.011* 0.024* -0.005 -0.015 0.009 0.009 
 (1.58) (2.34) (1.82) (1.84) (-0.33) (-0.57) (0.80) (0.36) 
Chairman -0.068** -0.116** -0.007 -0.013 -0.076*** -0.150*** -0.038** -0.084** 
 (-2.29) (-2.50) (-0.89) (-0.75) (-3.81) (-3.84) (-1.98) (-2.18) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs 75,491 75,491 75,491 75,491 75,491 75,491 75,491 75,491 
Adj. R2 0.338 0.327 0.833 0.744 0.834 0.761 0.859 0.784 
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Table 4 
Determinants of Corporate Innovation Productivity (Connected Sample) 
This table presents the regression results on the determinants of corporate innovation productivity using 
the connected sample. The results are from pooled OLS regressions with year fixed effects only and 
also with combinations of other fixed effects. All regressions are estimated with year fixed effects, 
and variable definitions are reported in Appendix A. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based 
on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is 
indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. 
Panel A: Determinant of Innovation Productivity (Connected Sample) 
 
Pooled OLS Firm Fixed Effects 
Manager Fixed 
Effects 
Firm and Manager 
Fixed Effects 
 LPatents LCitations LPatents LCitations LPatents LCitation LPatents LCitations 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 
Size 
 
0.478*** 
 
0.625*** 
 
0.203*** 
 
0.223*** 
 
0.315*** 
 
0.422*** 
 
0.221*** 
 
0.295*** 
 (12.30) (11.74) (4.74) (2.72) (11.44) (8.88) (6.13) (4.26) 
ROA 1.840*** 2.941*** 0.296* 0.876** 0.366*** 0.814*** 0.180 0.562* 
 (5.17) (5.50) (1.66) (2.41) (2.72) (2.98) (1.26) (1.91) 
R&D 6.553*** 10.09*** 0.852** 1.556** 0.915*** 1.663*** 0.431 1.063* 
 (8.32) (8.23) (2.30) (2.48) (3.21) (3.18) (1.50) (1.92) 
Capx 1.527** 2.409** 0.135 -0.051 0.128 -0.045 0.021 -0.305 
 (2.24) (2.31) (0.49) (-0.08) (0.56) (-0.10) (0.09) (-0.62) 
Tang -1.352*** -2.061*** 0.344 0.928* -0.028 0.245 0.356 0.926** 
 (-5.68) (-6.00) (1.36) (1.76) (-0.14) (0.70) (1.62) (2.10) 
Lev -0.459*** -0.797*** -0.0164 -0.0936 -0.136 -0.318 -0.021 -0.153 
 (-2.61) (-3.08) (-0.13) (-0.38) (-1.30) (-1.60) (-0.19) (-0.71) 
Q 0.032** 0.063*** 0.033*** 0.064*** 0.037*** 0.066*** 0.031*** 0.057*** 
 (2.15) (2.81) (4.28) (4.78) (5.41) (5.86) (4.37) (4.98) 
HH 3.950*** 6.670*** -1.074 -0.514 -0.148 0.495 -1.245 -1.288 
 (2.62) (3.03) (-0.94) (-0.20) (-0.16) (0.31) (-1.20) (-0.57) 
HH2 -4.111** -7.262*** -0.414 -3.628 0.806 0.307 0.415 -0.789 
 (-2.15) (-2.66) (-0.33) (-1.22) (0.64) (0.14) (0.38) (-0.33) 
Retn -0.000 0.000** -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.000 0.000* -0.006 -0.001 
 (-0.44) (2.17) (-5.25) (-4.94) (1.00) (1.86) (-0.78) (-0.07) 
Vol 0.576*** 0.816** -0.0279 -0.337 -0.0793 -0.529** -0.110 -0.608** 
 (2.66) (2.53) (-0.17) (-0.99) (-0.66) (-2.23) (-0.76) (-2.03) 
KZ 0.000 0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.66) (0.77) (-2.17) (-1.14) (-1.27) (-0.86) (-1.02) (-0.77) 
Cash 0.435* 0.771** -0.027 -0.168 -0.001 -0.090 0.050 0.024 
 (1.79) (1.97) (-0.15) (-0.47) (-0.00) (-0.33) (0.34) (0.08) 
IOwn 0.0171 0.306 0.295*** 0.740*** 0.0305 0.244 0.159* 0.468*** 
 (0.09) (1.10) (2.80) (3.32) (0.38) (1.54) (1.84) (2.66) 
Log(Age) 0.329*** 0.468*** 0.178** 0.281* 0.196*** 0.227*** 0.156** 0.161 
 (6.54) (6.42) (2.15) (1.93) (4.48) (3.13) (2.34) (1.27) 
PSlice 0.145** 0.226** 0.042* 0.088* -0.052 -0.036 0.055 0.167* 
 (2.39) (2.26) (1.66) (1.69) (-0.92) (-0.35) (1.15) (1.75) 
Log(Tenure) 0.026 0.007 0.015 0.018 -0.062** -0.059 -0.027 -0.007 
 (0.75) (0.13) (1.17) (0.75) (-2.19) (-1.12) (-0.95) (-0.12) 
Vega -0.000 -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-1.54) (-2.01) (-1.97) (-2.28) (-1.96) (-2.61) (-2.80) (-3.20) 
Delta 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000** 0.000 
 (0.80) (0.33) (0.47) (-0.83) (0.54) (-0.78) (2.14) (0.03) 
Female -0.139** -0.221*** 0.024 0.093**     
 (-2.46) (-2.71) (0.99) (2.13)     
CEO 0.026 0.055 0.003 0.007 -0.003 -0.014 0.000 -0.012 
 (0.88) (1.18) (0.31) (0.39) (-0.15) (-0.36) (-0.01) (-0.35) 
Chairman -0.093** -0.141* -0.008 -0.003 -0.114*** -0.189*** -0.062** -0.093* 
 (-1.99) (-1.93) (-0.69) (-0.11) (-3.83) (-3.40) (-2.19) (-1.70) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs 40,697 40,697 40,697 40,697 40,697 40,697 40,697 40,697 
Adj. R2 0.355 0.350 0.839 0.757 0.834 0.768 0.908 0.859 
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Table 4 - Continued   
Panel B: R-Squared Decomposition (Connected Sample) 
   
  LPatents LCitations 
  Cov(Innov, Determinant) Cov(Innov, Determinant) 
 Determinant Var(Innov) Var(Innov) 
  Connected Sample 
      
R2 0.908 0.859 
Firm fixed effects 0.477 (52.58%) 0.415 (48.30%) 
Manager fixed effects 0.280 (30.89%) 0.259 (30.21%) 
Observable time variant characteristics 0.150 (16.53%) 0.185 (21.49%) 
Residuals 0.092 0.141 
      
No. of Firms 1,024 1,024 
No. of Managers 11,040 11,040 
No. of Movers 941 941 
No. of Obs. 40,697 40,697 
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Table 5 
Determinants of Corporate Innovation Productivity (Mobility Sample) 
This table presents the regression results on the determinants of corporate innovation productivity using 
the mobility sample. The results are from pooled OLS regressions with year fixed effects only and 
also with combinations of other fixed effects. All regressions are estimated with year fixed effects, 
and variable definitions are reported in Appendix A. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based 
on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is 
indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. 
Panel A: Determinant of Innovation Productivity (Mobility Sample) 
 
Pooled OLS Firm Fixed Effects 
Manager Fixed 
Effects 
Firm and Manager 
Fixed Effects 
 LPatents LCitations LPatents LCitations LPatents LCitations LPatents LCitations 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 
Size 
 
0.478*** 
 
0.625*** 
 
0.203*** 
 
0.223*** 
 
0.315*** 
 
0.422*** 
 
0.221*** 
 
0.295*** 
 (12.30) (11.74) (4.74) (2.72) (11.44) (8.88) (6.13) (4.26) 
ROA 1.840*** 2.941*** 0.296* 0.876** 0.366*** 0.814*** 0.180 0.562* 
 (5.17) (5.50) (1.66) (2.41) (2.72) (2.98) (1.26) (1.91) 
R&D 6.553*** 10.09*** 0.852** 1.556** 0.915*** 1.663*** 0.431 1.063* 
 (8.32) (8.23) (2.30) (2.48) (3.21) (3.18) (1.50) (1.92) 
Capx 1.527** 2.409** 0.135 -0.051 0.128 -0.045 0.021 -0.305 
 (2.24) (2.31) (0.49) (-0.08) (0.56) (-0.10) (0.09) (-0.62) 
Tang -1.352*** -2.061*** 0.344 0.928* -0.028 0.245 0.356 0.926** 
 (-5.68) (-6.00) (1.36) (1.76) (-0.14) (0.70) (1.62) (2.10) 
Lev -0.459*** -0.797*** -0.0164 -0.0936 -0.136 -0.318 -0.021 -0.153 
 (-2.61) (-3.08) (-0.13) (-0.38) (-1.30) (-1.60) (-0.19) (-0.71) 
Q 0.032** 0.063*** 0.033*** 0.064*** 0.037*** 0.066*** 0.031*** 0.057*** 
 (2.15) (2.81) (4.28) (4.78) (5.41) (5.86) (4.37) (4.98) 
HH 3.950*** 6.670*** -1.074 -0.514 -0.148 0.495 -1.245 -1.288 
 (2.62) (3.03) (-0.94) (-0.20) (-0.16) (0.31) (-1.20) (-0.57) 
HH2 -4.111** -7.262*** -0.414 -3.628 0.806 0.307 0.415 -0.789 
 (-2.15) (-2.66) (-0.33) (-1.22) (0.64) (0.14) (0.38) (-0.33) 
Retn -0.000 0.000** -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.000 0.000* -0.006 -0.001 
 (-0.44) (2.17) (-5.25) (-4.94) (1.00) (1.86) (-0.78) (-0.07) 
Vol 0.576*** 0.816** -0.0279 -0.337 -0.0793 -0.529** -0.110 -0.608** 
 (2.66) (2.53) (-0.17) (-0.99) (-0.66) (-2.23) (-0.76) (-2.03) 
KZ 0.000 0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.66) (0.77) (-2.17) (-1.14) (-1.27) (-0.86) (-1.02) (-0.77) 
Cash 0.435* 0.771** -0.027 -0.168 -0.001 -0.090 0.050 0.024 
 (1.79) (1.97) (-0.15) (-0.47) (-0.00) (-0.33) (0.34) (0.08) 
IOwn 0.0171 0.306 0.295*** 0.740*** 0.0305 0.244 0.159* 0.468*** 
 (0.09) (1.10) (2.80) (3.32) (0.38) (1.54) (1.84) (2.66) 
Log(Age) 0.329*** 0.468*** 0.178** 0.281* 0.196*** 0.227*** 0.156** 0.161 
 (6.54) (6.42) (2.15) (1.93) (4.48) (3.13) (2.34) (1.27) 
PSlice 0.145** 0.226** 0.042* 0.088* -0.052 -0.036 0.055 0.167* 
 (2.39) (2.26) (1.66) (1.69) (-0.92) (-0.35) (1.15) (1.75) 
Log(Tenure) 0.026 0.007 0.015 0.018 -0.062** -0.059 -0.027 -0.007 
 (0.75) (0.13) (1.17) (0.75) (-2.19) (-1.12) (-0.95) (-0.12) 
Vega -0.000 -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-1.54) (-2.01) (-1.97) (-2.28) (-1.96) (-2.61) (-2.80) (-3.20) 
Delta 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000** 0.000 
 (0.80) (0.33) (0.47) (-0.83) (0.54) (-0.78) (2.14) (0.03) 
Female -0.139** -0.221*** 0.024 0.093**     
 (-2.46) (-2.71) (0.99) (2.13)     
CEO 0.026 0.055 0.003 0.007 -0.003 -0.014 0.000 -0.012 
 (0.88) (1.18) (0.31) (0.39) (-0.15) (-0.36) (-0.01) (-0.35) 
Chairman -0.093** -0.141* -0.008 -0.003 -0.114*** -0.189*** -0.062** -0.093* 
 (-1.99) (-1.93) (-0.69) (-0.11) (-3.83) (-3.40) (-2.19) (-1.70) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs 40,697 40,697 40,697 40,697 40,697 40,697 40,697 40,697 
Adj. R2 0.355 0.350 0.839 0.757 0.834 0.768 0.908 0.859 
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Table 5 - Continued   
Panel B: R-Squared Decomposition (Mobility Sample) 
   
  LPatents LCitations 
  Cov(Innov, Determinant) Cov(Innov, Determinant) 
 Determinant Var(Innov) Var(Innov) 
  Full Sample 
      
R2 0.903 0.853 
Firm fixed effects 0.640 (70.78%) 0.595 (69.76%) 
Manager fixed effects 0.143 (15.85%) 0.113 (13.21%) 
Observable time variant characteristics 0.121 (13.37%) 0.145 (17.02%) 
Residuals 0.097 0.147 
      
No. of Firms 1,024 1,024 
No. of Managers 941 941 
No. of Movers 941 941 
No. of Obs. 5,659 5,659 
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Table 6 
Robustness Tests 
 
This table presents several robustness test on the relative importance of each class of 
determinants in explaining innovation productivity measured in terms of the number of patents 
and the number of citations. The determinants are all the variables used in Table 4, but are 
classified into: (i) firm fixed effects, (ii) manager effects, and (iii) Observable time variant 
characteristics, and (iv) residuals. The percentage of R2 attributable to each group of 
determinants is reported in parentheses. 
 
  LPatents LCitations 
  Cov(Innov, Determinant) Cov(Innov, Determinant) 
 Determinant Var(Innov) Var(Innov) 
      
  Sample of Firms with Patents 
      
R2 0.893 0.843 
Firm fixed effects 0.371 (41.59%) 0.235 (30.04%) 
Manager fixed effects 0.251 (28.09%) 0.261 (30.95%) 
Observable time variant characteristics 0.271 (30.32%) 0.329 (39.01%) 
Residuals 0.107 0.157 
      
No. of Firms 526 526 
No. of Managers 6,234 6,234 
No. of Movers 435 435 
No. of Obs. 22,879 22,879 
     
  Sample of CEOs 
      
R2 0.908 0.859 
Firm fixed effects 0.235 (25.71%) 0.233 (26.43%) 
Manager fixed effects 0.458 (50.09%) 0.446 (50.53%) 
Observable time variant characteristics 0.221 (24.20%) 0.203 (23.04%) 
Residuals 0.092 0.141 
      
No. of Firms 161 161 
No. of Managers 288 288 
No. of Movers 84 84 
No. of Obs. 1,198 1,198 
      
  Sample of CEOs in Firms with Patents 
      
R2 0.907 0.868 
Firm fixed effects 0.425 (46.82%) 0.333 (38.41%) 
Manager fixed effects 0.242 (26.72%) 0.303 (34.93%) 
Observable time variant characteristics 0.240 (26.46%) 0.231 (26.66%) 
Residuals 0.093 0.132 
      
No. of Firms 75 75 
No. of Managers 154 154 
No. of Movers 38 38 
No. of Obs. 634 634 
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Table 7 
Impact of Manager Raids / Sudden Death on the Innovation Productivity 
 
This table presents the regression results on the determinants of the innovation productivity 
(measured in terms of the number of patents and the number of patent citations) with respect 
to manager deaths and raids. The sample focuses only on firms whose executives die suddenly 
or are raided. Post is a dummy variable that indicates the period subsequent to year 0 in which 
a manager’s sudden death or raid occurs, and Raid is an indicator variable that equals one if a 
manager is raided to join another company and 0 if a manager dies suddenly. All variables are 
defined in the appendix. All regressions are estimated with year effects, and the t -statistics 
associated with regression coefficients are reported in parentheses. These statistics are based 
on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. Significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% level 
is indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively 
 
Variable LPatents LCitations LPatents LCitations 
P ost -0.059 -0.153 -0.087 -0.222 
  (-0.34) (-0.45) (-0.53) (-0.70) 
Raid 0.229 0.368 0.145 0.283 
  -0.9 -0.88 -0.59 -0.69 
P ost × Raid -0.146 -0.154 -0.085 -0.045 
  (-0.72) (-0.40) (-0.46) (-0.13) 
Size 0.593∗∗∗ 0.767∗∗∗ 0.552∗∗∗ 0.739∗∗∗ 
  -6.61 -5.55 -6.29 -5.6 
ROA 2.417∗∗ 2.883∗ 2.168∗∗ 2.119 
  -2.49 -1.8 -2.37 -1.42 
R&D 8.534∗∗∗ 10.747∗∗∗ 7.885∗∗∗ 8.352∗∗ 
  -3.48 -2.78 -3.37 -2.32 
Capx 0.624 1.407 0.357 0.474 
  -0.28 -0.37 -0.17 -0.13 
Tang -0.335 -0.793 -0.161 -0.313 
  (-0.45) (-0.69) (-0.23) (-0.29) 
Lev -0.187 -0.657 0.025 -0.275 
  (-0.35) (-0.79) -0.05 (-0.36) 
Q 0.129∗∗ 0.196∗ 0.137∗∗ 0.202∗∗ 
  -2 -1.96 -2.2 -2.11 
HH 6.206 13.769∗ 3.214 9.123 
  -1.31 -1.69 -0.62 -1.07 
HH2 -7.512 -31.897∗ -3.495 -24.536 
  (-0.83) (-1.95) (-0.37) (-1.59) 
Retn 0.027 0.002 -0.037 -0.111 
  -0.35 -0.01 (-0.51) (-0.84) 
Vol 0.987 1.413 0.639 1.173 
  -1.19 -0.97 -0.81 -0.86 
KZ 0.005∗ 0.009 0.005∗ 0.007 
  -1.67 -1.5 -1.78 -1.47 
Cash 0.026 -0.104 0.163 0.358 
  -0.04 (-0.09) -0.26 -0.33 
IOwn -0.16 0.268 -0.218 0.11 
  (-0.31) -0.34 (-0.46) -0.15 
Log(Age) 0.213∗ 0.122 0.221∗∗ 0.164 
  -1.83 -0.66 -2.01 -0.93 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs 637 637 637 637 
Adj. R2 0.71 0.649 0.632 0.54 
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Table 8 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) Associated with Manager Deaths/Raids and Firms with High vs. Low 
Innovation Productivity 
This table reports only the key regression coefficients from regressing 5-day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) associated with the 
announcement of manager sudden deaths or raids on two variable indicators (Raid and HInnov) and their interaction as well as all the 
control variables used in Table 7. All variables are defined in the appendix. Raid is an indicator variable that equals one if a manager 
is raided by another company and 0 if a manager dies suddenly. HInnov is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm belongs to a 
highly innovative group and 0 if otherwise. We define highly innovative firms as those whose innovation productivity is above the 
median productivity in our sample of firms. We employ four different models to compute the parameters used in estimating CAR over 
a 150-day period: (i) market adjusted, (ii) the market model, (iii) the Fama-French 3-factor model, and (iv) the Fama-French 4-factor 
model. The 150-day period ends two weeks before CAR is computed. Assigning the announcement date as day 0, the CAR is computed 
between day -2 and day 2. All regressions are estimated with year and industry fixed effects and the t-statistics associated with the 
regression coefficients are reported in parentheses. These statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
 
 Market Adjusted Market Model 
Fama-French 3- Factor 
Model 
Fama-French 4- Factor 
Model 
Indicator All High Low All High Low All High Low All High Low 
 
Raid 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.012 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.010 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.010 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.013 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.011 
Death 0.011 0.005 0.013 0.007 -0.006 0.011 0.010 0.002 0.013 0.015 0.016 0.015 
Diff(R-D) -0.022 -0.017 -0.024 -0.017 -0.005 -0.021 -0.021 -0.015 -0.021 -0.026 -0.027 -0.026 
 (-1.54) (-0.69) (-1.31) (-1.19) (-0.21) (-1.16) (-1.47) (-0.67) (-1.18) (-1.79) (-0.94) (-1.47) 
DID(H-L)  0.007  0.016  0.006  -0.001 
  (0.24)  (0.59)  (0.20)  (0.05) 
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Table 9 
Multivariate analysis of Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) associated 
with Manager Deaths / Raids 
This table reports only the key regression coefficients from regressing 5-day cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) asso- ciated with the announcement of manager sudden deaths 
or raids on two variable indicators (Raid and HInnov) and their interaction as well as all 
the control variables used in Table 7. All variables are defined in the appendix. Raid is 
an indicator variable that equals one if a manager is raided by another company and 0 if 
a manager dies suddenly. HInnov is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm belongs 
to a highly innovative group and 0 if otherwise. We define highly innovative firms as those 
whose innovation productivity is above the median productivity in our sample of firms. 
We employ four different models to compute the parameters used in estimating CAR over 
a 150-day period: (i) market adjusted, (ii) the market model, (iii) the Fama-French 3-
factor model, and (iv) the Fama-French 4-factor model. The 150-day period ends two 
weeks before CAR is computed. Assigning the announcement date as day 0, the CAR is 
computed between day -2 and day 2. All regressions are estimated with year and industry 
fixed effects and the t-statistics associated with the regression coefficients are reported in 
parentheses. These statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
 
 Market Adjusted Market Model 
Fama-French 
3- Factor 
Model 
Fama-French 
4- Factor 
Model 
 
Raid 
 
-0.004 
 
0.008 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.014 
 (-0.18) (0.37) (-0.22) (-0.54) 
HInnov 0.000 -0.020 0.001 0.018 
 (0.01) (-0.67) (0.04) (0.48) 
Raid × HInnov -0.028 -0.023 -0.026 -0.036 
 (-0.86) (-0.79) (0.88) (1.01) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 154 154 154 154 
Adj. R2 0.077 0.211 0.123 0.143 
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Appendix 
Variable Definition 
 
Variable Definition Data Source 
Innovation     
   
LPatents Natural logarithm of one plus aggregate number of patents filed in application year t by firm i NBER Patent Dataset 
LCitations 
Natural logarithm of one plus aggregate adjusted number of citations received by the patents filed in year t by 
firm i, where adjusted number of citaton is computed by multi- plying each patent’s raw citation by the 
weighting index from Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001, 2005) 
NBER Patent Dataset 
      
Firm Characteristics     
      
Size Natural log of total assets of firm i in fiscal year t Compustat 
ROA 
Earnings before interest and depreciation of firm i in fiscal year t divided by its book value of total assets in 
t 
Compustat 
R&D Research and development expenditure divided by book value of total assets in year t and set to 0 if missing Compustat 
Capx Capital expenditure scaled by book value of total assets in year t Compustat 
Tang 
Tangibility defined as net property plant and equipment of firm i in fiscal year t divided by total assets in 
year t 
Compustat 
Lev Total debt of firm i in fiscal year t divided by its book value of total assets in year t Compustat 
Q 
Market value of equity plus book value of assets minus book value of equity minus balance sheet deferred 
taxes, divided by book value of assets in year t 
Compustat 
HH 
Herfindahl index of firm i in fiscal year t, calculated as the sum of the squared share of each firm in total 
industry sales based on sales at the 4-digit SIC code 
Compustat 
HH2 Square of HH Compustat 
Retn Firm i’s annual stock return CRSP 
Vol 
Standard deviation of monthly returns over the past five years and then annualized by multiplying by the 
square root of 12 
CRSP 
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Appendix 
Variable Definition – Continued 
 
Variable Definition Data Source 
Firm Characteristics – Continued    
KZ 
Firm i's Kaplan-Zingales index measured at the end of fiscal year t, calculated as -1.002*Cash 
Flows/K + 0.283*Q + 3.139*Leverage/Total Capital - 39:368*Dividends/K - 1.315*Cash/K, where 
Cash Flows = (Income before extraordinary items in t + total depreciation and amortization in t), 
K = PP&E in t - 1, Q = (market capitalization in t + total shareholder's equity in t - book value of 
common equity in t – deferred tax assets in t)/Total shareholder's equity in t, Debt = total long-term 
debt in t + notes payable in t + current portion of long-term debt in t, Dividends = total cash 
dividends paid in t (common and preferred), Cash = cash and short-term investments in t 
Compustat 
Cash Cash of firm i in year t divided by total assets Compustat 
IOwn Percentage of total shares outstanding held by 13f institutional investors Thomson Reuters 
Age Firm is age, approximated by the number of years from firms IPO as reported in CRSP CRSP 
     
Manager Characteristics    
PSlice 
Pay slice defined as the difference between the total pay of the manager (TDC1) and the median 
total compensation of the other managers in year t by firm i 
ExecuComp 
Tenure 
The number of years the manager has been with the company, which equals the difference 
between the year of the observation and the year when the individual joined the firm 
ExecuComp 
Vega 
Change in the dollar value of the manager wealth for a one percentage point change in the 
annualized standard deviation of stock returns at the end of the fiscal year 
ExecuComp 
Delta 
Change in the dollar value of the manager wealth for a one percentage point change in stock price 
at the end of the fiscal year 
ExecuComp 
Female A dummy variable that equals one if the manager is a female and zero if otherwise ExecuComp 
CEO 
A dummy variable that equals one if the manager is the CEO in a particular year and zero if 
otherwise 
ExecuComp 
Chairman 
A dummy variable that equals one if the CEO of the firm is also the board chairman and zero if 
otherwise 
ExecuComp 
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